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The War on Drugs has been symptomatic and has co-generated  
U. S. – Mexico relations in the twentieth century. Now, at the beginning  
of the 21st century it seems evident that a threat emerging from use of drugs, 
including drug violence and other long-term negative effects, have reached 
unexpected proportions. This phenomenon has come that far that undermines 
the basics of democracy, rule of law and civil liberties. Drug trafficking not only 
tends to ruin lives of individuals who lose their personal integrity, an ability  
to self-resistance and power to think rationally, not only tends to enrichment  
of drug dealers who jeopardize their top-notch living in order to earn more. 
Furthermore, it subverts democratic institutions, separations of powers  
or checks and balances system, economic processes and civil society.  
It attacks a political system, judiciary, police and military forces in its core;  
it dismantles efforts of profit and non-profit organizations,  
of journalists striving for an objective approach and safeguarding freedom  
of expression, and of any individual person ready to appeal against lawlessness 
and mistreatment. Eventually, it also helps to disintegrate  
the international system as it has been portrayed in the pages of the Charter  
of the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights.   
Some authors call War on Drugs “a new threat” that suddenly appeared 
in 1990s (Eissa, 2005: 10). Yet, we come into a trend that has been underway 
for long decades and politicians of state governments have long avoided due 
solutions. With a dire development in Vietnam War Richard Nixon has 
proclaimed War on Drugs    an underlying issue of his presidential campaign  
at the end of 1960s (Baum, 1996: 10). While becoming a president he 
presented his iron fist against drug smuggling and the notional War on Drugs 
could have been born. Nixon´s successors continued in this restrictive current 
meanwhile drug production and transshipping coming from Latin American 
countries began to rise enormously. Original drug families have been replaced 
by smaller and more efficacious drug trafficking groups that operate all across 
the region and have been closely interconnected with organize crime.     
 What actually stands beyond drug business? Dan Baum purports that 
War on Drugs have rarely been about drugs (Baum, 1996: 1). A well-known 
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economist Milton Friedman sees a main cause in stances of politicians that lead 
to prohibition instead they would legalize narcotics, and therefore to take down 
black market and to enable free choice for people between using  
and non-using.1 We must understand this opinion providing we are familiar  
with Friedman´s neoliberal thinking. Still, it is relevant to say there might be 
some trouble directly in criminalization which is politically sidelined and one 
rather focuses on armed operations that constrain ordinary citizens whereas 
kingpins of drug trafficking organizations remain untouched.    
However, if we pull back from the context of drugs between these two 
countries it is necessary to set a basic question “Why is U. S. – Mexico 
relationship so exceptional than any other”. Andrew Selee labels  
it as “an intense and complex relationship next door” (Selee, 2010: 1). The truth 
is that in no other part of the world there exists such a rapport where a highly 
developed and a developing country live side by side; although metrics  
for Mexico´s stage of development vary author by author. This gives  
an appropriate space for a unique asymmetry apparent in political, economic, 
social and cultural perceptions. Conversely, this imbalance supports          
a permanent interdependence where neither the United States nor Mexico can 
leave easily. Not only three thousand kilometer border link these diverse 
neighbors. In 2010, U. S. exported $163.3 billion and imported $229.7 billion 
across the border.2 This relates to a significant transformation of Mexico  
in recent years that is both politically and economically becoming more potent. 
Yet, catastrophic poverty, weak law enforcement and judicial power, pervasive 
corruption and badly controlled and administered northern states leave  
the federation exposed to internal and external threats. The United States is  
the most powerful economic power as well as it remains the world´s largest 
consumer market for illegal narcotics (Selee, 2010: 33). Hundreds  
of documented and undocumented immigrants cross border every day to settle 
down in the country that offers a haven of opportunities. Additionally,  
U. S. – Mexico relationship is determined by openness or isolation of both 
                                                            
1 Friedman, Milton: 2008. Why Drugs Should Be Legalized. YouTube June 6th 2008. See 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nLsCC0LZxkY, February 12th 2012.  
2 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. U. S. – Mexico Trade Facts. See 
http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/mexico, February 15th 2012.   
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countries. This factor constitutes its character and rationalizes either vivid 
cooperation or total ignorance.   
The goal of my work will expose achievements and failures of American 
and Mexican drug-related strategies with emphasis on U. S. approaches. 
General assessment of achievements and failures will be conducted via 
particular aspects – impacts of mutual interaction in the security sphere, other 
alternatives to this war and forecasting probable scenario. Analysis will 
represent a method of the work. My bachelor´s work is divided into three 
chapters.  
The first chapter will deal with the character of the War on Drugs which 
was initiated by the Mexican president Felipe Calderon shortly after assuming 
power in 2006. Initially, I will briefly introduce huge economic overhaul starting 
with NAFTA ratification following up with transition of the political system  
in Mexico from authoritarian to democratic regime.  Then I will concentrate  
on combating organized crime, underlying moments in the struggle against drug 
gangs and also show effects on lives of ordinary Mexicans. I will use statistics  
of security operations including assessments of positive and negative gauges. 
Indicators of corruption, functioning of police and military forces  
and trustworthiness of judicial organs as well as power of civil society  
and exploitation of journalists may not be left out.  
  The second chapter will analyze particular perils that have a decisive 
clout on U. S. national security. In the preliminary I will outline number  
of asymmetries that encompasses U. S. – Mexico relations. Aftermath, I will 
concentrate on the perception of drug using in American politics and society 
and the problematic of drug consumption that spurs on to demand for drugs  
and consequently for a vast inflow of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, 
methamphetamines and other narcotics. I will also focus on adjacent problems 
that together constitute bunch of U. S. national security threats – firearms 
trafficking, money laundering, spill-over violence, exodus of  narco-refugees  
and related inflows of immigrants as well as securitization and sustainability  
of U. S. – Mexico border.  
In the third chapter I will tend to show documents and resources which 
the United States uses to react to above said matters and to reflect primarily 
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challenges and risks for U. S. national security. I may not omit a reform  
of Mexican constitutional system itself that goes to police and judiciary 
transformation together with transformation of the armed forces. I consider 
inclusion of this ambitious start an integral part of bilateral collaboration. I will 
proceed from the Mérida Initiative which may symbolize a significant overhaul  
in U. S. – Mexican strategies; I will explore examples of positive steps forward 
as well as challenges that must be taken in consideration. I will proceed from 
the Border Security Program of the U. S. Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) that is responsible for prevention, protection and effective law 
enforcement in case of danger for U. S. domestic security. I will mention the  
U. S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and concretely Southwest Border 
Initiative which seeks to eliminate and pulverize activities of drug organizations 
and to turn down drug corridors heading northwards. I will mention the Strategic 
Plan – Fiscal Years 2010 – 2016 of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms 
and Explosives (ATF).  I will also utilize documents of the White House 
especially the National Security Strategy and the National Control Drug Policy. 
Other sources come mostly from U. S. and Mexican universities  
and from specific institutes dedicated to these issues.  
Contemporary situation in the region takes place not just around  
U. S. – Mexican border, but permeates deeply into the heart of both countries, 
as well. I will outline the implementation of possible consensus between 
presidents Calderon and Obama in common combat against undermining 
security environment not just via iron fist, but in the form of other supporting 
means. I will present a concept which will trace a way of counter-narcotics 
measures in both short and longer run.           
The future of bilateral cooperation does not resonate much within                 
the framework of the U. S. foreign and security policy at the moment meanwhile 
Mexico feels an urgency threatening stability and prosperity of the whole 
federation.  If the United States repudiates its role in the American continent 
and especially in the context of drugs, it might shatter its position  





1 Drug War in Mexico  
Statistics of death toll differentiate survey by survey and no-one can capture 
exact numbers, however, since the onset of the officially proclaimed War  
on Drugs in 2006 we have seen an alarming uptick of drug-related crimes such 
as murders, kidnappings, extortions, rape, human trafficking and other atrocities 
that Mexican civilians must carry on their shoulders. Does this dangerous 
phenomenon refer to a cyclical stigma where heydays are regularly substituted 
by decays of society or does it make anything unprecedented that Mexicans 
have never witnessed, yet? We must look for the answer in the historical line  
of the Mexican state.      
 
1.1 Historical outline  
The United States of Mexico has experienced two tumultuous centuries 
which were underpinned by strong centralistic shackles, by foreign interventions 
as well as by warm international collaboration. Contradictory stances towards 
the international community have been forming domestic policies and have 
illustrated that Mexico is still not in concert with the role that should play  
in the future.   
   
1.1.1 Since independence up to 1982 
Latin American peoples have always been drifted by perceptions  
of independence, which was escalated by the widespread wave  
of emancipation at the beginning of 19th century when they threw off yoke  
of their former colonial powers (Kozák, 2010: 28). Mexico was no exception. 
Moreover, it was compelled to interact with its northern neighbor.   
A decade during Mexicans fought for their sovereignty was completed  
in 1821 (Cinco de Mayo) when Mexico became an independent state after 
having been inspired by Bolivarian philosophy. Several years after achieving 
supremacy Mexico started to crumble into pieces when firstly lost Texas  
and then entered Mexican-American War with catastrophic consequences.  
The Guadaloupe Hidalgo Agreement and the Gadsden Purchase have laid 
foundations for a perpetual trauma that continued to 20th century and might still 
matter even at the present. Aftermath,  a weakened state has been smashed  
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by the European intervention that installed a bastion of the French empire there 
and targeted to destabilize Mexico and the United States at that time stricken  
by the civil war. Nonetheless, this episode lasted only few years and Mexico 
submerged into a half-century of a rigid dictatorial regime under baton of Porfirio 
Díaz. Porfiriato era was born in the spirit of suppression of native citizens, but 
welcomed and protected foreign investors, which sowed seeds for future 
dependency on the United States of America.    
In 1910, Mexican campesinos (peasants) rebelled in the Mexican 
Revolution and overthrew Díaz, which was followed by the two American 
interventions to prevent destabilization of the region. These offensive 
interferences triggered another series of anti-American/ gringo aversion.  
The Bucareli Agreement together with the nascent Great Depression threw 
Mexico into more than a seventy-year-long authoritarian reign of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI, Partido Revolucionario Institucional).  
Years following the end of World War II have been indicated “el milagro 
mexicano” (Mexican miracle) because despite U. S. limitations on immigration, 
nationalization of domestic and foreign enterprises and total encapsulation  
of Mexican political system, Mexico was experiencing an extraordinary 
economic boom.  
   
1.1.2 Bankruptcy and political turmoil  
A positive upswing of economy was supported by discovery of oil 
reserves in the Gulf of Mexico, which jumpstarted Mexico City to invest  
in exporting petroleum and simultaneously to borrow vast loans from 
international banks. Sadly, after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 oil prices 
skyrocketed and accelerated Mexico´s borrowing. Mexico´s debt mounted, 
inflation was enormous and interest costs from petroleum sales started to go 
down.   
In 1982, Mexico declared a state bankruptcy which directly affected  
the whole Latin America and other continents, as well. Devastating effects  
of the Mexican financial crisis hit the United States, particularly via rising 
immigration and drug smuggling. Conversely, mythical Mexican protectionism 
was over and era of greater bilateral integration might have started. Washington 
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in exchange for cooperation came up with certain demands such as opening  
of Mexican economy, free elections, freedom of press and acceptance  
of American drug war policy (Kozák, 2009: 7).        
A new president of Mexico Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988 – 1994) 
welcomed an American initiative in launching free trading to diminish illicit drugs 
and illegal immigration and to help flourishing employment and growth in both 
countries. In 1994, after Salinas´ brilliant obscuring drug issues NAFTA was 
signed by Canada, United States and Mexico. In parallel to new investments 
into Mexican economy negative effects were striking as written  
by Jorge G. Castañeda “…for Mexico to become a dynamic market  
for American exports – thus providing good jobs at good wages – it had  
to maintain an overvalued currency that would eventually drive Mexican firms 
out of business, and Mexican workers out of their jobs” (Castañeda, 1995: 32). 
These concerns exacerbated Zapatista insurgents in Chiapas, who certainly 
took part in assassinations of politicians3, as well as a repeated devaluation  
of Mexican peso.       
 
1.1.3 Entry to democratic millennium   
Promising chances for a political change evaporated in the mid-90s 
thereby had to wait another six years when Vicente Fox Quesada (2000 – 2006) 
from opposition National Action Party (PAN, Partido Acción Nacional) was 
elected president. The process of democratization began – mayors  
and governors from then excluded parties suddenly settled in their offices; 
citizens were enabled to vote freely, to express their opinions and to find new 
work and study opportunities; a substantial revolution of the constitutional 
system was carried out.  
                                                            
3 A guerrilla movement EZLN (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional) that espoused 
Emiliano Zapata, a leader of the Mexican Revolution in 1910, fought openly against NAFTA 
ratification because of notion of the U. S. neocolonial domination over the Mexican territory. 
Series of dubious acts happened in the ratification year of 1994. PRI candidate Luis Donaldo 
Colosio and PRI secretary José Francisco Ruiz Massieu were killed and two other politicians 
were kidnapped. Though, investigations did not reveal who committed these murders, it seemed 
apparent the linkage led to organized crime groups. See Castañeda, Jorge G.: 1995.  
The Mexican Shock. Its Meaning for the United States. The New Press: New York, p. 65 - 111. 
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The administration of George W. Bush received these ambitious steps 
and manifested willingness to support transitional efforts of Mexico, however, 
after 9/11 attacks U. S. enthusiasm receded and Mexico occurred on the side 
track. In addition, with unlocking the political system, Mexico became vulnerable 
to various groups linked to organized crime, which together with mounting 
immigration threatened stability of U. S. – Mexico border. As part  
of counterterrorism strategy Bush administration tightened building fences  
and strengthened border patrols.4  
When Fox´s successor Felipe Calderon Hinojosa (2006 – 2012) came  
to power, the country was tossed about violent practices of drug gangs, 
profound poverty and inequality among citizenry as well as among particular 
federation states. In this light, Calderon declared a resolute War on Drugs at all 
costs.    
 
1.2 Dire drug-related violence 
Mexico has had a colorful life in smuggling contraband dating back  
to the early twentieth century, which peaked at times of Prohibition, when 
Mexican barons partially controlled distribution of alcohol and psychotropic 
substances. The second part of 20th century has brought to game drugs which 
immensely modified the character of illegal market. Thousands of deployed 
police and military forces, daily seizures of narcotics, guns and cash,  
and a stream of arrests and extraditions targeting organized crime did not,  
in fact, help to diminish this unsatisfactory trend. Instead, drugs became more 
accessible, more widely utilized, and more potent than ever before.  
Luis Astorga and David A. Shirk outline four conceivable scenarios  
for managing drug use:  
• Complicity with traffickers 
• Confrontation of traffickers 
• Prevention and treatment 
• Tolerating consumption (Astorga; Shirk, 2010a: 32)  
                                                            
4 “Border policing is not simply a policy instrument for deterring illegal crossings but a symbolic 
representation of state authority, it communicates the state´s commitment to marking and 
maintain the borderline.” See Andreas, Peter: 2000. Border Games. Policing the U. S. – Mexico 




1.2.1 Drug trafficking organizations 
Nowadays, Mexico fights in a regular war far overreaching Heidelberg 
Institute for International Conflict Research´s characterization of armed conflicts 
and wars.5 According to STRATFOR 2010 report there are two main struggles 
for “lucrative turf” in the security landscape of Mexico – between the Mexican 
government and trafficking groups, and among trafficking groups themselves.6  
Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) or sometimes called cartels7 
embody      a driving force of violence activities. These violent groups struggle 
to protect their plazas, or zones of control for shifting illicit goods northward  
to market in the United States. Fragmentation of DTOs and polarization  
of the federation disrupt balance of power and paralyze security apparatus  
of Mexico.  
These days, some DTOs stand out in between others that fail to address 
U. S. demand and to avoid tough restrictions of the Mexican government.  
In following lines, I enclose brief overview of drug trafficking organizations 
operating throughout Mexico. 
 
 Sinaloa Cartel – Mexico´s largest cartel that dominates so-called Golden 
Triangle (Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua states) and stretches out  
to other continents. Its leader Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera is 
                                                            
5 “A war is a type of violent conflict in which violent force is used with a certain continuity in an 
organized and systematic way. The conflict parties exercise extensive measures, depending on 
the situation. The extent of destruction is massive and of long duration.” Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research. Methodological Approach since 2003. See 
http://hiik.de/en/methodik/methodik_ab_2003.html, February 25th 2012.  
6 STRATFOR: 2010. Mexican drug wars: Bloodiest Year to Date. Texas, Austin, p. 13. 
7 Drug War terminology differs according to how theoreticians and policymakers view it. “Drug 
cartel” stands for an organized crime syndicate involved in the production, distribution and sale 
of psychotropic substances. In their remarks Molzahn, Ríos and Shirk purport that interpretation 
of “cartel” is much broader including “formal, informal or even implicit agreement among 
business associations, or firms, to control production, fix prices, limit competition, and/ or 
segment markets by product, clientele, or territory”.  “Drug trafficking organization” term is 
widely used but often avoided by the U. S. government for not reflecting all kinds of trafficking 
goods. “Trans-National Criminal Organization” term accepted by the U. S. government but often 
denied by observers because organized crime groups do not have to necessarily operate in 
trans-national waters.  The most simplified term “organized crime groups” symbolizes a more 
generic expression. See Molzahn, Cory, Ríos, Viridiana, Shirk, David A.: 2012. Drug Violence in 
Mexico. Data and Analysis Through 2011. Trans-Border Institute, San Diego, California: p. 4.   
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currently the most wanted person viewed by the FBI. Sinaloa Cartel 
governs over important transport junctions in Ciudad Juarez and Tijuana.  
 
 Gulf Cartel – It is formerly the most powerful cartel that wages brutal 
battles against Los Zetas in conjunction with the New Federation 
(Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel and La Familia Michoacana) to keep 
strongholds in Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas states.  
 
 Los Zetas – A relatively new cartel, previously impersonated an armed 
wing of the Gulf Cartel and comprised of former Guatemala army 
deserters, operates in northeastern Nuevo Leon state. Its ruthless tactic 
of public intimidation uses up in Central and South America, too.    
 
 Juarez Cartel – Sometimes called Vicente Carrillo Fuentes Organization 
after the name of its leader, represents a thriving counterpart to Sinaloa 
Cartel in northern states using modern fighting techniques such  
as improvised explosive devices. It continues to be a major purchaser  
of Colombian cocaine. 
 
 Arrellano Felix Organization/ Tijuana Cartel – A cartel riddled  
with infighting and arrests fights battles against Sinaloa Cartel for a drug 
corridor along      the borderline of Tijuana – San Diego.    
 
 Beltran-Leyva Organization – A network of cartels, that has been 
splintered after a death of Arturo Beltran Leyva in 2009, at the present 
fights for its territories in central and western states of Morelos  
and Guerrero.   
 
 La Familia Michoacana – The 2009 most violent gang, once  
as a paramilitary group designed by Los Zetas, now in alliance  
with Sinaloa and Cartel cartels against its former employer. After calling 
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truce with the government in December 2010, the cartel went through 
series of arrests and almost collapsed (Olson; Shirk; Selee, 2010b: 6).      
 
1.2.2 Clashes on background of Calderon´s repressive policy 
Drug-related violence has become extremely elevated in 2005  
in the period of lame-duck president Vicente Fox who pioneered in conducting 
institutional reforms to combat drug violence and organized crime more 
effectively. In December 2006,      an offensive rhetoric of Felipe Calderon has 
soon turned into real crackdowns on drug lords launching “Joint Operation 
Michoacán” (Operativo Conjunto Michoacán) deploying 6, 500 soldiers  
and police in the state of Michoacán (Meyer, 2007: 1) Ever since, more than 
45,000 troops have been deployed to several states of the Mexican federation.8  
Nevertheless, a repressive approach promoted by the present 
administration came to grief because figures of violence-affected people have 
not dropped conversely they have grown to astronomical amounts. Beginning 
War on Drugs in late 2006 through 2011 there were over 50, 000 homicides 
attached to organized crime with 2011 as the bloodiest year of 16, 466 
casualties.9 This shows an ominous tendency when a number of death toll is 
tremendously lifting every single year. David A. Shirk attributes three essential 
factors that have shaped escalation of Mexican drug-related violence in recent 
years:  
 
• The fractionalization of organized crime groups  
• Changing structures of political-bureaucratic corruption 
• Recent government efforts to crack down on organized crime 
(through military deployments and the disruption of DTO 
leadership structures) (Shirk, 2010c: 11). 
 
                                                            
8 STRATFOR: 2012. Polarization and Sustained Violence in Mexico´s Cartel War. Texas, 
Austin. See http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/polarization-and-sustained-violence-mexicos-cartel-war, 
February 28th 2012. 
9 WM Consulting. 2012. Knowledge Is Security. See http://sites.google.com/site/policereform/, 
February 28th 2012.  
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Governmental released data during first nine months of 2011 explored 12,  
903 “homicides allegedly caused by criminal rivalry” meanwhile it accounted  
for 10, 240 organized crime homicides, 1, 652 organized crime-government 
clashes, 740 organized crime direct attacks on officials and 311 organized 
crime clashes among criminal groups.10 For example, last April there were 
exposed mass graves of 183 bodies in Tamaulipas state apparently slain  
by sledgehammers or burned alive, and two weeks later 100 corpses were 
extracted in the state of Durango.11 Latest news also illustrate 26 bodies left  
in Guadalajara and 35 dismissed police officials in Veracruz who were later 
found dumped on a road.12  
 Of course, we cannot only criticize Calderon´s administration  
for downsides while not seeing obvious achievements. The year of 2010 has 
been quite successful in disrupting DTOs via killing, arresting and incarcerating 
their bosses.13 Yet, these good catches might have assisted other more 
resistant DTOs in transforming themselves, liquidating former rivals  
and inventing innovative smuggling methods. Thus, the country´s security 
situation is increasingly becoming more susceptible to subversive entities.    
What really boosts violence activities of the criminal groups? There is no 
doubt that narcotics constitute a chief element in battling over territories,  
in slaying human lives and destroying human dignity, disrupting family bonds 
and finally rupturing legality and legitimacy of the state and governing 
authorities. According to up-to-date statistics, about 60 percent of Andean 
                                                            
10 Molzahn, Cory, Ríos, Viridiana, Shirk, David A.: 2012. Drug Violence in Mexico. Data and 
Analysis Through 2011. Trans-Border Institute STRATFOR: 2012. Polarization and Sustained 
Violence in Mexico´s Cartel War. Texas, Austin. See 
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/polarization-and-sustained-violence-mexicos-cartel-war, February 
28th 2012., San Diego, California: p. 6.   
11 Economist: 2011. Mexico´s drug war. Shallow graves, deepening alarm. Economist April 28th 
2011. See http://www.economist.com/node/18621268, February 20th 2012.  
12 Archibold, Randal C.: 2012. Mexico´s Drug War Bloodies Areas Thought Safe. New York 
Times January 18th 2012. See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/world/americas/mexico-drug-
war-bloodies-areas-thought-safe.html?_r=2, February 20th 2012. 
13 Major cartel leaders and their networks brought down in 2010: Eziquiel Antonio “Tony 
Tormenta“  Cardenas Guillen of the Gulf Cartel; Eduardo “El Teo” Garcia Simental  of the 
Arrellano Felix Organization; Sergio “El Grande” Villareal Barragan;  Edgar “La Barbie” Valdez 
Villarreal faction of the Beltran-Leyva Organization; Ignacio “El Nacho” Coronel  Villarreal; 
Nazario “El Mas Loco” Moreno Gonzalez of La Familia Michoacana. See STRATFOR: 2010. 
Mexican drug wars: Bloodiest Year to Date. Texas, Austin, p. 14. 
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cocaine went through Mexico in 2011 in comparison to 1 percent in 2007.14 
Between the years of 2005 and 2009 seizures of heroin have tripled whilst 
marijuana and methamphetamines shipping increased, as well.15 Do these 
indicators truly reflect a functioning strategy of the law enforcement  
and government operations?  
One may object this is happening just in few states in northern part  
of the country bordering directly on the United States, where Tijuana and Juarez 
rank among areas with the deadliest murder rate in the world. However, we can 
observe growing drug-related violence in other territories of the federation.  
The Federal District of Mexico City and neighboring Mexico state seem  
to be much more secured than any other federation unit. Still, as explained  
by the Economist “…in fact, murder rate in Mexico City is the lowest because 
other places have deteriorated faster”.16 With southern Acapulco´s being  
the second most violent city in Mexico17 we might be witnessing  
an overwhelming spread of drug-related atrocities as DTOs are realizing   
a renowned “balloon effect” when pressure applied on one area is relocated  
to another place with less resistance.    
 
                                                            
14 “Mexico´s drug system is not labor-focused like in Columbia or Afghanistan, says Brookings 
narcotics expert Vanda Felbab-Brown, but the drug trade still provides direct or indirect 
employment for much of its population. She estimates that as much as 40 to 50 percent of the 
Mexican population works in the "informal, if not illegal, economy." Officials estimate that the 
drug trade makes up 3-4 percent of Mexico's $1.5 trillion annual GDP--totaling as much as $30 
billion--and employs at least half a million people.” See Rawlins, Aimee: 2011. Mexico´s Drug 
War. Council on Foreign Relations December 13th 2011. See 
http://www.cfr.org/mexico/mexicos-drug-war/p13689, February 20th 2012. 
15 In 2005, law enforcement agencies seized 228 kilograms of heroin, 1,044, 549 kilograms of 
marijuana and 2,919 kilograms of methamphetamines. In 2009, total seizure reached 670 
kilograms of heroin, 1,493,096 kilograms of marijuana and 3,488 kilograms of 
methamphetamines. See U. S. Department of Justice: 2010. Drug Movement Into and Within 
the United States. U. S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center, National Drug 
Threat Assessment 2010 February 2010. See 
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs38/38661/movement.htm, March 2nd 2012.  
16 In the Federal District there is 1 policemen to 100 people, still 9 out of 10 crimes go 
unreported. See The Economist: 2011. Mexico´s presidential election. Campaigning against 
crime. The Economist May 26th 2011. See http://www.economist.com/node/18744547, February 
22nd 2012. 
17 Archibold, Randal C.: 2012. Mexico´s Drug War Bloodies Areas Thought Safe. New York 
Times January 18th 2012. See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/19/world/americas/mexico-drug-
war-bloodies-areas-thought-safe.html?_r=2, February 20th 2012. 
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1.3 Challenges for Mexican authorities 
Apart from organized crime violence prompted by production, distribution 
and consumption of narcotics, Mexico has been facing severe institutional 
challenges     at the same time. It is extremely hazardous to confront subversive 
entities without consolidation of the political and justice system, police  
and military forces; without lessening gaps in the society; without offering 
opportunities to any individual who can either take advantage of or throw away. 
Otherwise, the entire socio-economic establishment jumps into a complete 
agony whereas defrauding and circumventing law and order happen  
to be a norm.        
As Peter Andreas has noted, “The smuggler is dependent on the state  
in multiple ways. The most obvious but essential point is that state laws provide 
the very opening for smuggling in the first place…The method, intensity, 
and the focus of law enforcement shapes the location and form of smuggling, 
the size and structure of the smuggling organizations, and the cost  
and profitability of smuggling.”18 Joaquín Villalobos coins a similar idea via 
propagating four supporting pillars:  
• To reduce criminal density at maximum 
• To restore authorities of the critical territories 
• To strengthen security and justice institutions 
• To foment civil changes in the conduct of inhabitants19  
 
1.3.1 Institutional challenges 
I place corruption first because I believe this phenomenon has long been        
a profound structural problem that hampers the very basics of democracy, rule 
of law and civil society. According to Transparency International´s Corruption 
Perceptions Index 2011 Mexico occupies 100th place from total 183 countries 
and territories being ahead of its Latin American fellow countries  
                                                            
18 Andreas, Peter: 2000. Border Games. Policing the U. S. – Mexico Divide. Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca: New York, p. 22 – 23.  
19 Villalobos, Joaquín: 2012. Nuevos mitos de la guerra contra el narco. Infolatam January 2nd 
2012. See http://www.infolatam.com/2012/01/03/nuevos-mitos-de-la-guerra-contra-el-narco/, 
February 22nd 2012.  
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like Venezuela, Paraguay or Nicaragua.20 Corruption is directly tied  
up with a dire reality when 40 percent of Mexicans live in poverty  
and 18 percent in extreme poverty (Brands, 2009: 19) therefore there is  
an open floor for ubiquitous bribery practices present in hospitals, education, 
judiciary, traffic and federal police as well as in financial machineries during 
highly overcharged political campaigns.21   
Law enforcement system has also been heavily attacked by corruption 
and embezzlement. Although police forces have come through significant 
transformation in recent years, they remain vulnerable enough to outside 
influences. There is a weak coordination between federal and hundreds of state 
and municipal police units. They often lack proper trainings  
and equipment, which eventually forces them to fall behind drug gangs. Yet, we 
might observe promising signs of change in education of police officers  
and appropriate punishments for misconduct of power.22  
Meanwhile, the military indulges in a publicly acknowledged reputation 
when citizens favor army to police because of better capability and efficiency  
to tackle organized crime calamities. However, this may no longer be a truth 
because in the light of human rights abuses people are getting under protection 
of drug cartels that supply them with food, clothes, toys for children,  
and organize festivals. We may view a parallel world where state is retreating 
from obligation to protect its residents. Extrajudicial killings, torture, illegal 
interdiction, rape and robbery executed by the military and appalling percentage 
                                                            
20 Transparency International: 2011. Corruption Perceptions Index. Transparency International: 
Berlin.  
21 Economist brings sinister statistics where unlimited spending in political campaigns is by 60 
percent fueled by drug gangs, at the municipal, state and even federal level. Economist: 2011. 
Crime and Politics in Mexico. A turning tide. Economist June 30th 2011. See 
http://www.economist.com/node/18897585, February 22nd 2012.  
22 Since the beginning of Calderón´s War on Drugs in 2006 federal police forces have been 
expanded fivefold from 6,500 to 35,000 with 7,000 college degrees holders. In 2010, 3,000 
federal policemen were fired for misconduct. See CNN: 2011. Mexico sees hope among drug 
violence. CNN February 9th 2011. See 




of impunity create a suitable environment for arousing fear, insecurity  
and delinquencies.23 24           
 This all is fueled by obsolete justice system that often rules on old 
colonial principles. Changeover from “inquisitorial” legal system to “adversarial” 
model turned out to be rather problematic, and “currently only cases of torture, 
rape and enforced disappearance are handled by civilian prosecutors”, the rest 
is managed by military investigators who expectantly cover any improprieties 
conducted by their colleagues and subordinates.25 Human Rights Watch is 
urging the United Nations on suing Mexico for human rights abuses  
at the international level.26  
 
1.3.2 Grassroots  
Journalists, reporters and media photographers belong to one  
of the most touched and endangered groups in Mexico. Committee to Protect 
Journalists ranks Mexico 8th deadliest country for reporters ever.27 They put 
forth their lives in order to inform the public about heinous crimes carried  
out by drug trafficking organizations as well as by the army. Unfortunately, 
publicizing cruelties in the newspapers, on blogs and social sites have led  
to series of brutal massacres of reporters, which eventually means a more 
robust media censorship. Nevertheless, last year a huge protest wave burst out 
throughout Mexican towns and villages where demonstrators gathered and set 
out a “silent march” to project their discontent and disgust over    the present 
situation. A leading figure Javier Sicilla, a distinguished poet and father  
of an assassinated son, made it clear: “For the government, everything is  
                                                            
23 From more than 3,600 investigations of human rights abuses carried out by the military only 
15 uniformed have been sentenced. See El Universal. Crece ´horrorosamente violencia´, alerta 
HRW. El Universal January 23rd 2012. See http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/primera/38652.html, 
February 25th 2012.  
24 Plata o plomo = a terminus technicus that forces officials to choose between bribery or death.  
See http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/polarization-and-sustained-violence-mexicos-cartel-war  
25 Los Angeles Times: 2011. Mexico´s war with itself. Los Angeles November 21st 2011. See 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/nov/21/opinion/la-ed-mexico-20111121, February 25th 2012.  
26 Aguilar Camín, Hector: 2011. Ni seguridad ni derechos. Infolatam November 10th 2011. See 
http://www.infolatam.com/2011/11/10/ni-seguridad-ni-derechos/, February 28th 2012.   
27 Committee to Protect Journalists: 2011. Attacks on the Press in 2011. See 
http://cpj.org/2012/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-2011-mexico.php, March 3rd 2012. 
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a question of statistics, of collateral damage, of abstractions…Now we are 
going out into the street to say this: Every city has its story. Every town has  
a story. The story is full of faces of pain…This is a country that cannot tolerate 
anymore.”28  
This quiet repugnance against lawlessness, hypocrisy and inertia 
signified a formidable boost for once idle society that sent warning  
to the federal government that they will no longer tolerate war crimes  
and crimes against humanity.  
 
1.3.3 Great expectations?  
Do these bleak trends reveal a vicious circle where Mexico finds no 
purposeful instrument to stagger from? The Mexican federation may be truly 
moving in the conflict spiral, it does not mean that fails to guarantee other 
sectors of state such as medical and health care, education, transport  
and communication infrastructure, money and banking system, environmental 
stability etc.  
Shannon K. O´Neil alerts that Mexico is experiencing a monumental rise 
of   the middle-class, which has always been a driving force of democracy.29 
During the contemporary financial crisis Mexico was hardest hit in Latin 
America, but quickly recovered, successfully beefed up tourism sector and GDP 
growth through vivid interconnection with U. S. companies and U. S. 
consumers.30  
                                                            
28 CNN: 2011. Mexican poet becomes crusader after son´s slaying. CNN May 5th 2011. See 
http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/americas/05/05/mexico.poet.activist/index.html, March 3rd 
2012. 
29 The middle-class in Mexico is approximately between 35 – 45 million people. There are more 
investments in children and education, growing per capita income, huge growth in consumer 
products and sells of cars; many multinational and Mexican companies begin to thrive; we may 
see explosion of stores and malls. Moreover, Mexicans see changes in their lives compared to 
lives of their fathers. A growing optimism is really apparent in Mexican society. See Shannon K. 
O´ Neil: 2011. The Rise of Mexico´s Middle Class. Council on Foreign Relations November 1st 
2011. See http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2011/11/01/the-rise-of-mexico%E2%80%99s-middle-class/, 
February 24th 2012. 
30 Shannon K. O´ Neil: 2012. Mexico´s Burgeoning Economy Amid Drug Violence. Council on 
Foreign Relations February 21st 2012. See http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2011/11/01/the-rise-of-
mexico%E2%80%99s-middle-class/, March 3rd 2012.   
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Alberto Ardura asserts that “the fifteen plus years of fiscally responsible 
policies have made Mexico´s economy the healthiest in the hemisphere”.31 
Everything will hinge on Mexico´s strong will to find right solutions  
and to cooperate in the bilateral and multilateral scheme. It must be taken in 
account that no successful result can be accomplished without active U. S. 

























                                                            
31 Shannon K. O´ Neil: 2011. Mexico on the Road to 2012. Council on Foreign Relations 
October 31st 2011. See http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2011/10/31/mexico-on-the-road-to-2012/, 




2 Imminent threats for the U. S. National Security 
The United States of America is currently going through difficult times 
although it stands in the forefront of world events. Doctrines of containment,  
roll-backing and deterrence the Soviet Union has predestined U. S. “grand 
strategy” within bipolar competition. Two decades after the end of the Cold War 
the U. S. is desperately seeking a new “grand strategy” which would define its 
role in the architecture of the international system. Tragic disasters of 9/11 
attacks should have shown America´s new fierce  
enemy – global terrorism – which was worth to extirpate in its anti-American or 
anti-Western appearance. However, it came out to be unfeasible to fight 
asymmetric danger by traditional mind-set of waging wars and by conventional 
tactics and weapons. In addition, financial crisis and subsequent recession, 
newly emerged economic powers confronting U. S. dominance at the world 
market, two long-lasting and exhaustive wars, fear of weapons of mass 
destruction and possible nuclear war, unstable and bureaucratic political 
system, technocracy versus civil movements, swelling disparities and diversities 
in the society – this all America must face immediately. Still, it remains to be 
world hegemony that benefits both from hard power and soft power.            
National security is not solely a tool of realists in theories of international 
relations who manipulate with state as the only actor in the international system; 
but it predominantly guarantees and protects determinants  
of state – inhabitants, territory, and sovereignty.  
Peter Katzenstein calls national security concept an extraordinary mixture 
of neorealism with Hobbesian philosophy of egoistic self-interests (of states  
in this case), zero-sum game and balancing the power, and neoliberalism  
with establishment of diplomatic international relations, multilateral institutions 
and political economy in the post-hegemonic world (Katzenstein, 1997: 6).     
The latest U. S. National Security Strategy 2010 states that “…our national 
security depends upon America’s ability to leverage our unique national 
attributes, just as global security depends upon strong and responsible 
American leadership. That includes our military might, economic 
competitiveness, moral leadership, global engagement, and efforts to shape an 
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international system that serves the mutual interests of nations and peoples. 
For the world has changed at an extraordinary pace, and the United States 
must adapt to advance our interests and sustain our leadership”. 32 
It is blatant Mexico is not playing a decisive role in forging America´s new 
“grand strategy”, but it inevitably incarnates the strongest relationship  
and interconnectedness in the Western hemisphere – together with Canada. 
George Friedman in his futurist work Next 100 Years. A Forecast for 21st 
Century anticipates new fault lines unfolding in following decades where Mexico 
can be audaciously classified among Asia-Pacific, Eurasia, Europe  
and the Muslim world (Friedman, 2009: 82). 
In the light of America´s struggle for global supremacy, regional 
competitiveness and preservation of its own traditional values as well  
as Mexico´s enduring transitional complexities and likely engaging in the family 
of world economic powers; this shows unavoidable U. S. – Mexico 
interdependence going on.   
 
2.1 Historical asymmetry 
There are several versions of asymmetries embracing U. S. – Mexico 
relations and in both countries you come across entrenched stereotypes  
and prejudices. In America Mexicans pejoratively called Chicanos are viewed 
as abusers of U. S. generous system, thieves of jobs for Americans  
and disrupters of American Creed – Americans have built upon for long 
decades – not only through cultural differences but also by religious influence 
when Hispanic Catholicism visibly penetrates major society of Protestant 
morale. Although above said aspects are often misguided, stereotypes prevail.   
On the other hand, Mexicans have had severe mistrust and suspicion  
to Gringo element in forming their autonomous regime. This is mostly enforced 
by      the valid revolutionary Constitution of 1917 that tells: 
„Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have 
the right to acquire ownership of lands, waters, and their appurtenances, 
or to obtain concessions for the exploitation of mines or of waters.  
                                                            
32 The White House: 2010. National Security Strategy 2010. The White House: Washington, D. 
C., p. 15. 
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The State may grant the same right to foreigners, provided they agree 
before the Ministry of Foreign Relations to consider themselves  
as nationals in respect to such property, and bind themselves not  
to invoke the protection of their governments in matters relating thereto; 
under penalty, in case of noncompliance with this agreement,  
of forfeiture of the property acquired to the Nation. Under no 
circumstances may foreigners acquire direct ownership of lands  
or waters within a zone of one hundred kilometers along the frontiers and  
of fifty kilometers along the shores of the country“ (Constitution  
of Mexico, art. 27, sec. I).   
   
Such a constitutional proclamation does not truly correspond  
with political, military and particularly economic interventions that have been  
in place since the mid-19th century. 
  
2.1.1 Political asymmetries  
Mexican ambitious attempt to imitate U. S. presidential political system 
have been created in the wrong direction, which partially lies in the Constitution 
of 1917. Conversely, it recently approximated in interesting dimension.  
U. S. Constitution have been drafted after a period of the Articles  
of Confederation, thus the Founding Fathers contemplated every option where 
to wend. It proceeds from the Anglo-American political tradition dating back  
to medieval times and crafting values of liberal democracy, parliamentary 
system, federalism and republicanism. Mexican Constitution has been drafted  
in the wake of ferocious Revolution with great emphasis on social justice  
and dislike of foreign players. Likewise, U. S. Constitution takes pride in English 
common law system, in which legal principles are processed in the judicial 
precedents, whilst the Constitution of 1917 is based upon European civil law 
system, in which concrete legal principles are codified directly in the articles  
and paragraphs of the Constitution.33      
                                                            
33 Wall, Alan: 2008. Comparing & Contrasting the USA and Mexican Constitutions. 
MEXIDATA.INFO February 4th 2008. See http://mexidata.info/id1707.html, March 12th 2012. 
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U. S. Constitution attributes all authorities that have not been demarcated 
to the federal government to each of fifty states, which establishes a thorough 
model of decentralized power in the country. Mexico has long dealt with highly 
centralized power centered to the Federal District and still ever since obvious 
democratization and decentralization Mexico City remains to be both political, 
financial, industrial, cultural and educational center compared to American 
diversification in    Washington, D. C., New York City and Los Angeles (Beer, 
2005: 13). 
Two-party political system in the United States based on checks  
and balances persisted since the beginning of the republic until today. It 
guarantees balance of executive, legislature and judiciary where president  
as a head of state chooses his administration that rules; where bicameral 
Congress approves laws and opposition party often filibuster president´s party 
efforts; and where the Supreme Court and sets of lower courts control all 
others. This leads to quite a fair division of powers where citizens thanks  
to majority constituencies may responsibly vote for one party or  the other. But it 
can also bring frustration and exhaustion from both Democrats and Republicans 
because of long-term usurpation of power and inclination to technocracy where 
parties lack their previous ideological background and become motivated  
by financial incentives. Mexican authoritarian experience have stigmatized  
the present when previously PRI leader coalesced with the president who  
de facto chose his staunchest acolytes in gubernatorial and public office 
positions. Nowadays, legislature divided into the Chamber of Deputies  
and the Senate is functioning in a complicated mixed-proportional system that 
hamstrings decision-making of the executive branch.   
 
2.1.2 Economic asymmetries    
Military actions have later been substituted by direct economic 
infiltrations such as ISI (Import substituting industrialization), Brady plan  
and finally NAFTA. Fear of repeated “la intervención norteamericana” (North 
American invasion) have driven Mexicans to think of perpetual inferiority to their 
northern neighbor.  
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Prior to NAFTA Mexico has cleared its way via strong protectionist 
policies until it pulled a massive liberalization of economy beginning in 1980s.  
In 2011, Mexico is walking in quite flourishing economic condition with real GDP 
volume of $ 1, 1 trillion, with GDP growth exceeding expected  
3,8 % and with unemployment rate reaching 5, 1 %.34 Meanwhile, the United 
States – having $ 15 trillion in real GDP volume, 1, 5 % in GDP growth  
and 8,3 % in unemployment rate35 in February 2012 – is recovering in a slower 
motion.  
Since the NAFTA ratification and implementation foreign direct 
investments (FDI) have been an integral part of U. S. – Mexico bilateral 
economic relationship.    In 2010, the United States earmarked $ 90, 3 billion  
in FDI for Mexico for operating in real estate, manufacturing plants and retail 
facilities. “Mexican FDI for U. S. in exchange totaled $ 12, 6 billion.”36 
Furthermore, there are assembly plants/ maquiladoras in economically 
most vibrant areas along the U. S. – Mexico border. In the wake of wild NAFTA 
implementation a duty-free status for all imports coming to Mexico regardless  
of  the country of the products have been approved but subsequent regulations 
put an end to this display and eliminated a duty-free status for imports  
from Canada and    U. S. only, which bolstered up uncertainty for companies 
and flattened differences on the NAFTA market with enforcing more affluent 
enterprises and excluding weaker ones. 
 
2.1.3 Cultural asymmetries  
It seems self-evident that not only political and economic asymmetries 
play     a relevant role in comparing these two nations. Cultural prejudices are 
                                                            
34 CIA The World Factbook. Mexico. See https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/mx.html, March 15th 2012.   
35 Trading Economics: United States Unemployment Rate. Trading Economics See 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-states/unemployment-rate, March 15th 2012.   
36 On economic issues, North American cooperation efforts have focused on increasing 
information sharing, harmonization of standards, productivity improvement, reductions in the 
costs of trade, and enhancement of the quality of life. The three countries have also addressed 
the need to enhance North American competitiveness through compatible regulations and 
standards that would help them protect health, safety and the environment, as well as to 
facilitate trade in goods and services across borders. See Angeles Villareal, M.: 2012. U. S. – 
Economic Relationship: Trends, Issues, and Implications. Congressional Research Service: 
Washington, D. C.  
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often what drive anti-American or anti-Mexican sentiments in both societies  
and what hinder closer political and economic approximation.  
Jorge Castañeda notices three divergences that alienate U. S.  
and Mexico society and peoples:  
 
• U. S. middle-class society vs. polarized Mexican society 
• Cultural difference in time perception 
• The role and weight of history in the two cultures (Castañeda, 
1995: 45). 
  
First, though significant changes have occurred in last two decades, Mexican 
society remains polarized with huge gaps and inequalities between rich  
and poor, town and country, north and south, and is suffering from profound 
colonial societal stratification between criollos, mestizos and Indians.  
The United States has still a strong     middle-class society despite recent 
upheaval of unemployed and dispossessed people. Second, time divides both 
nations. Notorious “mañana syndrome” determines Mexicans have different 
thinking of being on time, delivering on time and working on time in contrast  
to Americans who regard time as a sign of Protestant work ethic and capitalist 
consumerist lifestyle. Third, interpretation of history, its milestones, victories  
and defeats strikingly divides both nations. Americans are more oriented  
in the future meanwhile Mexicans look aback and historical concepts still remain 
on the table. “For the Americans, history is folklore plus the recent past;  
for Mexicans, it is the historicist essence of the present” (Castañeda, 1995: 42). 
 
2.2 Drug consumption in the U. S. 
The United States has the largest world market. Apart from common licit 
goods coming there from different parts of the world it has been unsheltered 
from an inflow of illicit narcotics that also found their way how to address  
the U. S. population. Since the Nixon´s and Reagan´s war on drugs authorities 
have been mostly focusing on enforcement and treating drug addicts  
as criminals. Currently, of over 2 million people held in prisons more than half 
has been incarcerated for drug use (Alexander, 2010: 59). Though, we have 
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seen a very subtle decline of price while availability and purity of drugs have 
risen constantly. This reflects a spiral where market needs have triumphed over 
penalties, drug seizures, border controls and militarized approach to eradicate 
consumption.  
Today, Mexico has become a major supplier of illegal drugs coming 
northward. Despite not being such a novelty, it is striking in what dimensions it 
has been assumed. As Peter Reuter and David Ronfeldt have noted, “Mexicans 
have always been available to supply whatever Americans want but cannot 
obtain legally in their own country – just as Americans have always been ready 
to provide whatever Mexicans want and cannot acquire readily in Mexico” 
(Reuter; Ronfeldt, 1991: 10).    
 
2.2.1 Perception of drug abuse 
Drug consumption is a behavioral problem. All first drug experience is 
carried out by a friend or family member who make easier for a future user to be 
acquainted with these psychotropic substances.  
Especially in minority and low-income communities narcotics entail a great 
concern because despite a massive anti-drug campaign they have a limited 
access to get to know genuine side effects of using. Most families think drug 
consumption should primarily be reduced between children and adolescents 
who start at increasingly earlier ages. Many Americans believe negative 
popularization via anti-drug advertisements has been very potent  
in liquidating drug demand. Conversely, it has also led to bigger popularization 
among youths whose decisions to take drugs have been tempted by billboards, 
bumper stickers and TV commercials. Americans have a very low tolerance  
for drug use in the workplace and only a slight majority thinks tough penal 
actions would be effective. They would rather prefer prevention, treatment  
and further education.37   
 
 
                                                            
37 Office of National Drug Control Policy: 1999. A Look at How Americans View the Country´s 
Problem. Office of National Drug Control Policy: Princeton, New Jersey. See 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/gallup/summary.html , March 18th 2012.  
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2.2.2 Prevention and treatment  
Laudatory messages that relate to more investments in prevention stumble 
on inaccurate results, though. Peter Reuter warns there is no existing reliable 
data on effectiveness of prevention programs. Similar education programs are 
targeted usually at children who are 10 – 15 years because these are years  
in which children are most susceptible to these messages as well as elementary 
and middle schools are more capable to address their pupils than high schools 
where it is far more problematic.  
Unlike, there are more encouraging statistics about treatment results. It 
shows that drug abuse treatment has helped to reduction of patients who, 
before treatment, commit serious offences. However, there is also a difference 
between particular substances where compared with results for opiates, 
treatment proved less effective in reducing crack cocaine use (Reuter, 2010: 
121 – 136).   
 
2.2.3 To reach the U. S. client  
Drug trafficking inside the United States has been similarly elaborate like 
in Mexico in which the only want is to reach the client and provide him  
with suitable goods. In reality, there is a complicated franchised system where 
drug cells are procured with supplies, know-how and labor force straight  
from their Mexican associates.   
The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy comes up  
with following statistics of what amounts the positive-tested patients used drugs 
– 83 percent of marijuana, 45 percent of cocaine, 38 percent of heroin and 62 
percent of methamphetamine have been debunked in a year of 2010. These 
chronic drug users came mostly from big cities such as Chicago, Sacramento, 
New York,      Washington, D. C. etc.38 
It seems that narcotics are mostly dispersed in populous urban areas  
and in   the Southwest. Lately, there has been a surge of drugs heading to the 
East Coast,   in particular cheaper black tar heroin produced in Mexico that  
                                                            
38 Office of National Drug Control Policy: 2010. ADAM II 2010 Annual Report. Office of National 
Drug Control Policy. Executive Office of the President: Washington, D. C., p. 18 – 19. See   




in places like Columbus, Ohio and Charlotte, North Carolina replaced more 
expensive Colombian white heroin (Díaz-Briseño, 2010: 98 – 115). 
 
2.3 Firearms trafficking   
Smuggling of illicit guns belongs to one of most heated issues while 
dealing with drug and organized crime violence all around the world. Many 
times the West has witnessed how donations for reducing poverty, hunger and 
diseases expansion, and enhancing living conditions headed for purchasing 
firearms to hands of criminal organizations. And today, major powers still sell 
their military arsenals to the developing countries – which they might later tackle 
with – in order to satisfy needs of armaments industry.   
Within the bilateral scheme of U. S. – Mexico relationship firearms have 
become subject of both academic, political and armament discussions. Both 
Mexican and American sides blame themselves for fomenting violence  
in the context of drug war in Mexico that might spill over to the U. S. 
Both countries proceed from their constitutional order that modulates how 
to treat guns according to law. The United States enshrined in the Amendment 
II to    the Constitution that “…the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, 
shall not be infringed” (U. S. Constitution, amend. II). A sentiment to defend own 
personality and property dates back to the times of British settlers coming  
to the New World and especially of rangers colonizing the West. Mexican 
Constitution allows its inhabitants “…to have arms of any kind in their 
possession for their protection and legitimate defense, except such as are 
expressly forbidden by law, or which the nation may reserve for the exclusive 
use of the army, navy, or national guard…” (Constitution of Mexico, art.10). 
Unlike the U. S., Mexico has passed series of restrictions of gun possession  
in recent years.  
It might be right time for reassessing the attitude toward the guns  
and armament material which in combination with narcotics may cause lethal 






2.3.1 Myth vs. reality  
Mexican government and Congress have been constantly criticizing  
the United States for enabling an easy way for drug trafficking organizations to 
get guns and therefore to protect their northbound drug trafficking routes.  
In 2010, for instance president Calderon having the statistics from ATF 
(Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) said that  
of 75,000 firearms seized in last three years about 80 – 90 percent or more than 
60,000 firearms came from the United States.39 This long-standing assumption 
of producing guns, arms and ammunition inside the U. S. and distributing them 
to hands of DTOs in Mexico makes from the U. S. the only culprit that should 
take responsibility from. Last year U. S. Attorney General Eric Holder, though, 
came up with the report that rejects these horrific numbers. The report tells that 
less than estimated 12 percent of guns seized in Mexico have been verified  
of U. S. origin according to recognized U. S. mandated serial number  
and firearms´ make and model. In addition, 20 percent of seized guns have 
been good-looking duplicates made by DTOs themselves.40 STRATFOR 
classifies three types of weaponry:  
 
• Guns legally available in Mexico 
• Guns legally available in the U. S. but not in Mexico 
• Guns not available for civilian purchase in Mexico  
or the U. S. (especially with origin in Asia and Latin America)41 
 
                                                            
39 Rowland, Kara: 2010. Calderon Blames U. S. Guns for Violence. The Washington Times May 
21st 2010. See http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/may/21/calderon-faults-us-guns-for-
mexico-violence/?page=all, March 20th 2012.   
40 Keane, Larry: 2011. Myth: 90 % of Mexican Drug Cartel Guns Come From U.S. 
Opposingviews October 19th 2011. See http://www.opposingviews.com/i/society/crime/myth-90-
mexican-drug-cartel-guns-come-us, March 22nd 2012.    
41 STRATFOR: 2011. Mexico´s Gun Supply and the 90 Percent Myth. STRATFOR February 
10th 2011. See http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110209-mexicos-gun-supply-and-90-percent-
myth?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110210&utm_content=readmore&e
lq=1ce9adcf3da240a19923ff84e0424a0a, March 22nd 2012.   
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No-one can truly trace how long the firearms were on release, what 
countries were fueling with violence before coming to Mexico, and who the first 
purchaser was – it is always a matter of speculation.    
 
2.3.2 Characteristics of firearms usage 
Firearms violence serves criminal organizations to “…either neutralize  
or force government officials to support their illegal enterprise” and also  
to attack and intimidate politicians, journalists, businesses, police and military 
(Goodman; Marizco, 2010: 173). Mexican DTOs create impression of real 
guerrilla warfare by seeking mostly for semi-automatic rifles AK-47 type  
and AR-15 type as well as using shotguns, pistols, hand grenades  
and rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) manufactured both in Central America 
and the United States. Police are often defenseless fighting them with old 
revolvers, few rounds of ammunition, little training and no bulletproof vests 
(Goodman; Marizco, 2010: 173 – 178).   
There is often a direct correlation between drug purchasers and firearms 
purchasers who launder money from illegal narcotics distribution to buy guns  
in order to get other psychotropic substances, which they come full circle again. 
President Calderon claimed that DTOs are “imposing fees like taxes in areas 
they dominate and trying to impose their laws by force of arms”42, which 
illustrates the tragic futility of Mexican authorities to act.    
 
2.3.3 To root out the enemy 
Since the onset of the War on Drugs Mexico has undertaken plenty  
of background checks, vehicle inspections, raids on suspected houses and sites 
possibly linked to organized crime and drug trafficking, and intensified 
collaboration with U. S. government and ATF on providing information about 
firearms investigations and prosecutions. Statistics of Secretaría de Defensa 
Nacional (SEDENA, Department of National Defense) comes up with 83,613 
                                                            
42 BBC News: 2010. Calderon: Mexico drug gangs seeking to replace state. BBC News August 
15th 2010. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-10877156, March 22nd 2012.   
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confiscated firearms in 2010, which entails unprecedented 603 percent upsurge 
in 5 years.43   
In response to these negative results U. S. and Mexican authorities 
orchestrated a counter-strategy called Border Enforcement Security Task Force 
(BEST) teams consisted from six cooperative bodies – U. S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), ATF, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), U. S. Attorney´s Office,  and Mexican 
federal police (Secretaría de Seguridad Pública). A wide range of operations 
have been set in motion under  the BEST.  
 
 Operation Armas Cruzadas (2008 – today) – a bilateral law enforcement 
and intelligence-sharing program for combating weapons smuggling  
in Mexico and the U. S.44   
 
 Project Gunrunner (2006 – 2011) – AFT program to stem the flow  
of weapons to Mexico. The sub-Operation Fast and Furious became 
scandalous. Initially,  it was designed to track the end station of firearms. 
Several federal agents, though, let straw buyers walk away from gun 
shops with weapons that headed straight to Mexican DTOs.45 
 
2.4 Money laundering 
There is a question if money can pose imminent threat to U. S. national 
security. However, if we look at this case from more general perspective, we 
can observe how financial stimulus twirls the entire vicious circle of drug 
trafficking and organized crime activities.      
 
 
                                                            
43 El Universal: 2011. El decomiso de armas crece 152 % al año. El Universal May 21st 2011. 
See http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/185628.html, March 22nd 2012.   
44 U. S. Embassy: 2011. Fact Sheet Combating Arms Trafficking. U. S. Embassy. See 
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/mexico/310329/7abril/Arms%20Trafficking%20April%202011%20Final.
pdf, March 23rd 2012.   
45 Al Jazeera: 2011. U. S. Government Regrets ´Gun-Walking´ Operation. Al Jazeera November 
8th 2011. See http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/11/2011118174711754456.html, 
March 23rd 2012.   
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2.4.1 Bulk cash shipments 
There has always been a vibrant circulation of cross-border commerce 
and later worker remittances between the U. S. and Mexico. Financial anxiety  
of Mexico and consequent NAFTA ratification opened the gate for uncontrolled 
expansion of bulk cash heading in both directions. New cyber-technological 
devices facilitated inflow of money obtained from smuggling contraband,  
and better infrastructure in transportation and communication helped to furnish 
simple shipment methods in comparison to Colombia.  
Criminal organizations mostly gain their money from distribution  
of narcotics. There is no wonder why they easily entangle with illicit drug trade 
providing 1 kilo of cocaine costs $1,000 in Colombia, while $2,500 in Panama, 
$6,500 in Costa Rica, $10,500 in Honduras, $13,000 in Guatemala, and when it 
gets to U. S. black market it reaches $30,500.46 They also benefit  
from trafficking of stolen cars, weapons and other goods. The estimates  
of the amount range between $6 billion to $36 billion a year according  
to the Mexican government and distinguished academics. “Historically much  
of the money – up to 80 percent by some estimates generated by the Mexican 
drug trafficking cartels – is used to buy new shipments of cocaine…” (Douglas, 
2010: 143). Drug dealers who often work as rotating drivers are forced  
to establish their own money service businesses such as casa de cambio  
and centros cambiarios to convert dollars to pesos which does not mean any 
trouble in the era of dollarization of Mexican economy. 
Investigations and prosecutions seem to be very cumbersome, insufficient 
and weak. Law enforcement agencies focus on seizure of bulk cash through 
main entry points on roads and highways and random surveillances  
of suspected sites. A promising breakthrough happened in 2008 when 
Congress passed law that gave access to preventative detention and asset 
forfeiture (Douglas, 2010: 150). Still, many cases remain unsolved and bulk 
cash shipments untouched. Moreover, it became almost impossible to check 
convoys with bulk cash shipments meanwhile thousands of vehicles  
and pedestrians crisscross the border every day.  
                                                            
46 International Crisis Group: 2011. Guatemala: Drug Trafficking and Violence. Latin America 




2.4.2 Involvement in money laundering 
Organized crime and money laundering practices have deeply infiltrated         
the country, which Douglas Farah illustrates with the following assertion:  
“the revenue generated from drug trafficking and criminal activity is dispersed 
throughout Mexican society, including business community, politicians, law 
enforcement and military personnel, the media and scores of other individuals” 
(Douglas, 2010: 157 – 160). Thanks to no transactions in dollarized Latin 
American economies Mexican DTOs find no obstacles to expand and dominate 
over cocaine factories in Colombia, Ecuador or Peru where replaced traditional 
narcofamilies.  
In reality, not only Mexican DTOs themselves are engaged in criminal 
activities. Recently, there has been an apparent upswing of bilateral trade 
between Mexico and China and the rumors have it that Mexican DTOs have 
been purchasing cheap plastic bags from China that serve as containers  
for narcotics.  
Likewise, law enforcement worries growing presence of Russian organized 
crime in Mexico that also brings violence. Russian mafia is buying up spate  
of properties on the west coast and especially unregulated casinos function  
as perfect dishwashers for laundering the money.  
 
2.5 Immigration 
The United States has become a nation of immigrants. Throughout  
the previous two immigration waves Britons, Irish, Italians, Greeks, Jews, 
Germans, Poles, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese and other nations have been 
sailing to a country of opportunities hoping that they will find new place to live 
and flourish. Gradually, they settled down and incorporated to a majority society 
creating a famous “melting pot”. Unlike, the third immigration wave beginning  
in the second half of 20th century has brought something new. Immigrants  
from Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua, Peru, Chile and other Latin American 
countries fled from their homelands (both legally and illegally)  
to the United States. Nowadays, a Hispano community comprise over  
16 percent (Humes; Jones; Ramirez, 2011: 5) of the total population  
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and represents    an integral part of U. S. society, economy and even politics 
where many of them serve as justices, representatives, governors,  
mayors – and they voice loudly even in the presidential elections. 
Even though Hispanics come from diverse background, Mexicans 
themselves amount to 60 percent of the whole Latino community dwelling 
mostly in southern     U. S. states. Historically, there has been a vivid interaction 
of the new emerging republics which intensified in the 20th century and peaked 
at the present.               The escalation of legal and illegal immigration might be 
justified by four Huntington´s attributes of U. S. – Mexico relationship:  
a) territorial contiguity, b) high percentage of Mexican immigrants in the U. S.,  
c) regional concentration and diasporas in the Southwest of the U. S., and  
d) historical reminiscence of the original territory (Huntington, 2004: 157). This 
is what distinguishes eminence of Mexican immigration from others.        
           
2.5.1 What stands behind? 
Historically, Mexicans have come to the U. S. because of work 
opportunities and new chances, but because of U. S. demand for a labor force, 
as well, just like for example during the Brazero program in WWII. Changing  
of approaches towards Mexicans in allowing and sudden restricting has swung 
side to side. Eisenhower´s Operation Wetback led to a mass deportation  
of illegal immigrants meanwhile Immigration and Nationality Act  
of 1965 canceled quotas for legal immigration, which again motivated 
newcomers to cross the border. Richard Nixon in the light of his War on Drugs 
triggered off Operation Intercept which was symbolized by tightening border 
controls. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 enacted  
by the U. S. Congress issued an annual list of countries that overtly cooperate 
and enable the floor for drug traffickers (Kozák, 2010: 165).  
Although President Clinton backed a ratification of NAFTA,  he performed 
steps to clamp down on illegal immigrants and smuggling of narcotics  
to the U. S. by building fences along the border and by strengthening high traffic 
areas south of San Diego (Operation Gatekeeper) and in El Paso (Operation 
Hold the Line). The budget of INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) has 
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tripled since the beginning of 1990s and southern U. S. border has suddenly 
become militarized.  
This was even more visible after 9/11 attacks when securitization  
of the border has become a top priority within the U. S. counter-terrorism 
strategy. At the same time with the establishment of the Department  
of Homeland Security U. S. Coast Guard authorized to interdict drugs and illegal 
migrants regained vigor, extending fences continued to grow, border 
inspections fit into a daily routine of cross-border travelling and trading, as well 
as toughening of the visa, admission and travel screening procedures (Andreas, 
2003: 5).      
2.5.2 Worrisome motive for immigration 
Some analysts doubt that Mexicans are flooding the U. S. territory just 
because of better wages and better working conditions. Ultimately, current 
economic crisis has struck U. S. market more than Mexican market and many 
U. S. businesses transfer their affiliates to Mexico. Very often, Mexicans 
themselves make decisions to come back home if they do not find proper jobs. 
Nonetheless, there is increasingly more severe motive to go to the U. S. at price 
of life or death.  
Lately, number of asylum seeker requests increased enormously. In 2008, 
312 Mexicans asked for asylum at the entry point and another 2,231 after 
entering the   U. S. in comparison to no request in 1990s. According to some 
estimates hundreds of thousands have fled from border cities across Rio 
Grande River to the U. S. and there are many Mexicans remaining who work  
in Mexico during the day, but come to the U. S. at night. However, it became 
almost unreachable for many Mexicans to obtain asylum seeker confirmation 
because firstly they are supposed to undergo investigations of credibility locked 
up in detention facilities, and to wait for a status of refugee (Kan, 2010: 5).  
Uncertainty, fear and anxiety unravel a level of insecurity imminently 
threatening the borderline and expelling Mexicans northward. We might trace 
some initial signs of spill-over violence that U. S. authorities should have  





2.5.3 Immigration reform vs. state attempts  
The absence of an elaborate immigration reform is what hurdles  
the process of dealing with cross-border migration and accurate procedures 
how to treat legal and illegal immigrants. The administration of George W. Bush 
has approximated most in preparing the motion, but eventually it broke down 
because the Republican Party split over the issue.  
Instead, the Patriot Act has been passed in 2003 as the effective tool  
to combat terrorism after 9/11 attacks. It authorizes FBI to raid on potential 
terrorists via using roving wiretaps, searches of business records,  
and concluding surveillance of “lone wolves” – individuals who operate 
independently on any terrorist group. Despite civic division over the issue, 
criticism of trampling on individual rights, spying on innocent people,  
and violating the Constitution, President Obama prolonged the effect for four 
more years. He rationalized his action with protecting all Americans  
and impeding  the pursuit of terrorists.47 The Patriot Act has been contested  
by immigrants who could have felt endangered.  
A long-lasting underestimation of the federal immigration policy has led  
to impetuous and emotional resolutions. In 2010, a controversial Arizona SB 
1070 came into effect. This law authorizes police to detain any suspected  
of being in the country illegally; aftermath they might identify, prosecute and 
even deport the detainees. Furthermore, not carrying immigration papers has 
been implemented as a state crime. It triggered massive demonstrations  
in Mexico where inhabitants worry of automatic harassment and discrimination 
against Hispanics. Such a precedent has generated a breeding ground  
for South Carolina, Utah and Alabama that also passed similar laws.  
The Department of Justice is currently suing those state administrations  
for exceeding jurisdiction.48       
     
                                                            
47 Abrams, Jim: 2011. Patriot Act Extension Signed by Obama. Huffington Post July 26th 2011. 
See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/05/27/patriot-act-extension-signed-obama-
autopen_n_867851.html, March 25th 2012.  
48 Archibold, Randal C.: 2010. Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration. New York Times 
April 23rd 2010. See http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/24/us/politics/24immig.html?_r=2, March 
25th 2012.   
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2.5.4 What is the future? 
Many lawmakers and opinion-makers urge the president to act  
on immigration policy. They recommend approving a comprehensive 
immigration reform, attracting high-skilled immigrants, granting a stay  
for students with advanced degrees, minimizing strict nationality quotas, 
eliminating work visas. They also advise to impose penalties on employers 
hiring laborers illegally, to simplify immigration administration, to promote border 
enforcement, and state and local enforcement, to guarantee an earned 
legalization for currently living illegal immigrants rather amnestying them,  
to grant greater discretion for detainees, and to create a special office within the 
Homeland Department dealing with refugee protection. They follow 
implementation of the DREAM act that grants legalization for children of illegal 
immigrants who attend college or perform military service, and demonstrate 
good moral character.49   
President Obama doubled Border Patrol agents, supported unmanned 
drones for collecting information, allowed “start-up visas” for foreign investors  
to open business in the U. S. and deported detainees who posed danger  
to U. S. national security. He claimed to legalize the status of almost 11 million 
illegal immigrants currently living in the U. S. except for criminals. Nevertheless, 
there is so much hesitation about future of immigration policy in case  
a Republican candidate wins   the presidential elections in November. 
Provisional proclamations of Republican Party nominees testify about numerous 
overhauls and completely different approaches.50  
To bring immigration issue to the table will not be an easy pathway, but it 
will definitely shape the future of bilateral relationship. Jorge Castañeda 
                                                            
49 Council on Foreign Relations: 2009. U. S. Immigration Policy Task Force Report July 2009. 
See http://www.cfr.org/immigration/us-immigration-policy/p20030, March 25th 2012.  
50 Various approaches towards the immigration policy have been heard in the Republican Party. 
Newt Gingrich suggests a creation of „Red Cards“ that would separate legalization from 
citizenship. Ron Paul would deploy troops along the border, abolish birthright citizenship and cut 
off welfare benefits for immigrants. Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum would support completing 
the fence along the entire length of the border. Michelle Bachman suggests to get down to mass 
deportations off all illegal immigrants and to complete the border fence until 2013. John 
Huntsman would bring „brain power“ to the country. Rick Perry expressed he would pay in-state 
tuition for foreign college students, to build up a strategic fencing in high traffic areas. See 
Council on Foreign Relations: 2012. The Candidates on Immigration. February 27th 2012. See 
http://www.cfr.org/united-states/candidates-immigration/p26803, March 25th 2012.  
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described it precisely: “…if Mexicans were placed on an equal legal footing  
with their peers in the United States, the process of eliminating the vestiges  
of Mexican political culture would be swifter and less painful” (Castañeda, 1995: 
27). 
    
2.6 Sustainability of the U. S. – Mexico border  
A globalized world of the 21st century has brought a notion that borders 
and their protection are no longer important as they used to be. Although  
9/11 attacks and subsequent War on Terror have initiated scores of precautions 
relating to homeland defense and security perimeters, an idea of powerful 
transnational actors, political and trading blocs is playing an increasingly 
substantial role within the framework of the international system. Thereby, we 
get to a paradoxical situation of greater need for liberalized trading without 
barriers and simultaneously tightening border patrolling to eradicate organized 
crime activities. 
Extending more than 3,000 kilometers the U. S. – Mexico border is paying 
for one of the most glaring examples of such a paradox. 
Additionally, as Paul Rexton Kan asserts there is also a linguistic division 
in   the perception of the border. “While in English ´border´ connotes a boundary 
that delineates a fixed separation that can serve as a barrier to the outside,  
in Spanish the word ´frontera´, which can also mean ´frontier´ - or the beginning 
of a new territory” (Kan, 2010: 1).   
2.6.1 Beyond the border 
The border region is defined in 100 kilometers on the U. S. side  
and 300 kilometers on the Mexican side and is comprised from four U. S. states 
(California, Arizona, New Mexico, Texas) and from six Mexican states (Baja 
California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas). More than 
83 million people live there. 
NAFTA freshened cross-border exports and imports. The mutual trade 
totaled over $ 293 billion in 2008, which has tripled in previous thirteen years. 
Land trade (rail, trucks and pipelines) prevails within the entire bulk of shipping 
goods. There are plenty of interconnected agglomerations such  
as Tijuana – San Diego, Laredo – Nuevo Laredo, Ciudad Juarez – El Paso 
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where high concentration of companies in manufacturing and service sectors is 
situated there. Notorious border factories called maquiladoras account  
for 76 percent of the total Mexico employment. Huge flow of human  
and economic capital is exchanged in corridors of both directions.  Despite  
the growth of drug-related violence more than 70 million international tourists 
visit  the cross-border region annually, which generates employment and higher 
incomes for locals. Interdependency is palpable in every place of the border that 
both U. S. and Mexico governments have supported collaborations between 
their governmental agencies, community groups, and businesses just  
to facilitate the exchange of information.51 Only a couple of countries 
themselves have larger GDP than            the border region. “What´s more,  
the region is growing faster than of either the country” (Selee, 2010: 41).      
Furthermore, deserts, rivers, forests, rangelands, and coastlines constitute        
a unique ecosystem that provides natural resources and critical ecological 
services, that enhances quality of life and sustains economic opportunities.     
2.6.2 De-bordering the border within 2030 vision 
Series of aggressive constraints toward the U. S. – Mexico border have 
led to   a serious question if the border policy have succeeded or failed. “Border 
policy is not simply a policy instrument for deterring illegal crossings but  
a symbolic representation of state authority; it communicates the state´s 
commitment to marking and maintaining the borderline” (Andreas, 2000: 8). 
Though, such a proclamation has frequently been misinterpreted and restricted 
to repressive measures rather than to think rationally where the causes sprang 
from.    
It became apparent that border crackdown escalated the emergence  
of more skilled and sophisticated migrant smuggling groups and methods  
of their undertaking.  Amongst severe problems of border deterrence policy 
Peter Andreas enumerates  the creation of “unintended closer ties between licit 
and illicit trade”, opening of more remote and dangerous entry points  
in the deserts and mountains, as well as “dramatic slow of cross-border traffic” 
                                                            
51 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: 2009. Strategic Guidelines for the 
Competitive and Sustainable Development of the U. S. - Mexico Transborder Region. Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars & El Colegio de la Frontera Norte.  
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usually for the sake of massive traffic jams and delays – this, for instance, has 
influenced negatively electronics, textiles, chemicals and Mexican factories 
supplying just in-time parts to U. S. auto companies   (Andreas, 2003: 8). 
What is the solution of this long-lasting paradox? Ambassador Andrés 
Rozental and Professor Peter H. Smith recommend de-bordering the border  
by “increasing law enforcement and inspection capabilities of traditional border 
areas, including airports and pre-clearance zones” (Rozental; Smith, 2005: 4). 
Putting the stress on outside customs and police checks meanwhile releasing 
pressure at the border in conjunction with precise information sharing might be 
a positive instrument how to way out. This should go hand in hand  
with harmonizing regulations in key sectors, unifying and expanding 
requirements for defining rules of origin and facilitating customs transactions.  
In cooperation with governments, lawyers, stakeholders, entrepreneurs, 
academics, and social and ecological partners a strategic plan has been 
developed – it bears name “A 2030 Vision: Building a Common Future 
Together, Goals and Objectives”. It foresees a sustainable, competitive, 
equitable, and secure a trans-border region in the next 20 years. This vision has 
four objectives: 
 
• Increasing the region´s competitiveness (support for logistics, 
labor productivity, governance, know-how, infrastructure, 
entrepreneurial spirit etc.) 
• Developing the sustainable region (conservation of water sources, 
climate change action through energy efficiency, comprehensive 
ecosystem management etc.) 
• Creating secure and safe region (information sharing, law 
enforcement and its trainings and professional standards, judicial 
reform and civic engagement, prevention and treatment etc.) 
• Improving quality of life for everyone (promoting bi-national 
coordination in health and medicine, education, livable havens  
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3 U. S – Mexico bilateral approach 
Unsatisfactory situation that tosses around Mexico and permeates deeply 
into the United States must be wisely wielded at the level of both Federal 
administrations, as well as at the state and local level.  
Initial incentives should stem from Mexico that must guarantee a recovery 
of its judiciary, armed forces and societal problems whose manifestations 
become an easy prey for drug trafficking organizations. However, the United 
States should not retreat from its responsibility. Monstrous consumption 
foments narcotrafficking and throws loads of civilians into a desperate circle  
of violence. The U. S. has installed several law enforcement agencies,  
and even special Department of Homeland Security has been created to fight 
terrorism, organized crime and to protect American soil and citizens. Apart from 
repressions they should not be afraid of backing up healthy society via 
particular prevention and treatment programs.     
Both the United States and Mexico should be able to communicate  
and share their information and intelligence and try to overcome mutual 
animosities regardless what ideological administration is currently in power.  
 
3.1 Mexican reforms of the institutional system 
Once we contemplate about tackling organized crime and drug trafficking 
Mexico must realize that initial proceedings ought to come from their decision-
making process. The United States of Mexico must first and foremost restore 
public trust in authorities and government, try to weed out corruption and tax 
evasions, handle abysmal inequality and poverty, and rather avoid militarization 
of the country that might bring chaos and disruption of state. Conversely, 
Mexico should make agreement among the public sphere and finish adopting 
crucial institutional reforms that impede subverting the country by individuals  
or by organized groups.    
 
3.1.1. Judicial reform  
The present criminal justice system is a bygone of then autocratic 
centralization which arbitrates according to obsolete federal criminal codes 
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dating back to 1870s and 1930s. An instructional judge leads investigation  
as well as makes decision about suspect´s guilt or innocence. This places 
him/her into a supreme position over prosecutors. Public mistrust in justice is 
enforced by weak prosecutions and impunity in dealing common crime (robbery, 
property crime) and organized crime. Additionally, long stay in jail without 
sentencing, overcrowded facilities, corrupt prison guards, prison violence, 
rioting, intimidation and often escapes worsen the situation. 
Last two presidents have attempted to make a shift of Mexico´s 
inquisitorial system toward a more adversarial model based upon Anglo-Saxon 
precedents. President Calderon proposed a judicial reform in 2008 which 
promotes four elements: a) oral trials in open court, b) emphasis on the right  
of the accused, c) reforming     the police, d) tougher measures for prosecuting 
organized crime. Likewise, it expands using wiretaps and in 2010 Calderon 
proposed an “Anti-Kidnapping Law” (Shirk, 2010c: 205 – 251). 
Despite ambitious steps forward most of the proposals still remain  
in the Congress. Some criticize the reform is trying to do too much because 
implementation of justice system lasts for decades, meanwhile others assert          
the reform has not gone far enough.53         
 
3.1.2. Police reform 
Restructuring police forces and placing them into the legal framework have 
been a main theme in past administrations. During the PRI regime public 
security has been successfully neglected. President Ernesto Zedillo was  
the first who founded   the National Public Security System (Sistema Nacional  
de Seguridad Pública, SNSP) and National Security Council alongside with 
Federal Preventive Police (Policía Federal Preventiva, PFP). He also attempted 
to purge Federal Judicial Police (Policía Judicial Federal, PJF). His successor 
Vicente Fox substituted PJF with Federal Investigations Agency (Agencia 
Federal de Investigaciones, AFI) and poured money to state police while 
neglected municipal forces. President Felipe Calderon replaced PFP and AFI 
with Federal Ministerial Police (Policía Federal Ministerial, PFM) and Federal 
                                                            
53  Hernandéz, José Luis: 2012. La reforma de justicia en México. Letras Libres March 29th 
2012. See http://www.letraslibres.com/blogs/polifonia/la-reforma-de-justicia-en-mexico, March 30th 
2012.   
49 
 
Police (Policía Federal, PF). He expanded their powers in conducting 
investigations, operating undercover, tapping phone lines, and locating cell 
phones. 
Still, complications hampering feasibility of police forces prevail. There 
persists corruption and collusion with organized crime bosses, abuses of human 
rights, poor investigations and high rates of impunity. Preventive police are 
often paralyzed because they are not authorized to arrest unless they catch 
someone red-handed, they are prohibited from handling evidence  
or interviewing witnesses, and they are often sent to unfamiliar districts. Alike, 
municipal units are underfinanced, which gives a strange impression if we bear 
in mind that vast majority of crimes are local crimes. A tendency to repudiate 
previous administrations via restructuring police, introducing new programs 
shatters stability and opens loopholes (Sabet, 2010: 247 – 268).   
 
3.1.3. Reforming the armed forces  
Apart from judicial and police reforms it is substantial for Mexico  
to reconstruct the armed forces. As written above, popular trust in the Army  
is much higher than police, ranking third after schools and the Church. There 
has been an assumption that the military can cope with DTOs more effectively 
and is less susceptible to corruption. However, the militarization and need  
for outcomes have contributed to human rights abuses among the civilians.  
Under President Fox sharing intelligence between military and civilian 
agencies increased and President Calderon also supports such a stance. 
Mexican military officers are trained at U. S. camps and schools getting better 
know-how, education, and tactics. Likewise, it seems that average Mexicans 
are becoming more willing to invite U. S. forces to quell drug-related violence, 
which enormously augmented presence of the U. S. professional agents  
(Ai Camp, 2010: 291 – 325).         
 
3.2 Mérida Initiative  
The United States and Mexico have made efforts to formulate a bilateral 
partnership to sort out common challenges together. U. S. interests in Mexico 
have visibly shrunk after 9/11 attacks once the Bush administration focused  
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on combating terrorism both in Afghanistan and in other parts of the world,  
and on the invasion in Iraq. In the Western hemisphere the U. S. concentrated 
on assistance to Colombia´s drug violence and eradication of poppy fields 
through infamous Plan Colombia.   
Thereby, U. S. – Mexico more intensive collaboration efforts have been 
limited to official visits, proclamations of statesmen, and to meetings  
of ambassadors and leading figures of both nations. Though, one such  
a conference in Mérida has laid foundations for future cooperation.  
 
3.2.1 Mérida at dawn – Bush and Calderon  
In 2007, Presidents George W. Bush and Felipe Calderon agreed  
on implementing an initiative in which U. S. would provide $1, 4 billion 
counternarcotics package for FY 2008 – FY 2010 to assist Mexico and Central 
America with a major share to Mexico. The Mérida Initiative includes three 
clusters: 1) Counter-narcotics, Counter-terrorism, Border Security, 2) Public 
Security and Law Enforcement,  3) Institution Building and Rule of Law;  
and designed five objectives of strategy:  
 
• “Reduce the flow of drugs into the U. S. 
• Disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organizations 
• Focus on the nexus between the drug trade and other potential 
threats to the U. S., including terrorism 
• Deny drug traffickers, narcoterrorists, and their criminal associates 
their illicit profits and money laundering activities 
• Assist foreign countries threatened by illegal drugs in strengthening 
their governance and law enforcement institutions” (Brands, 2009: 
25)  
 
The United States committed to procure Mexico with helicopters, 
surveillance aircrafts, X-ray inspection devices; to offer equipment and training 
for armed and law enforcement forces, as well as training for the drug-sniffing 
dogs; and to modernize computer and information systems in order to facilitate 
exchange of information and intelligence. In response, Mexico allotted $7 billion 
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to increase military expenditures, to double Federal Police forces, to carry  
out penitentiary and judicial reforms etc.         
Still, investing into repressive forces overshadowed a need for broader 
concept including anti-corruption and social programs, strengthening  
of institutional framework. Much of the planned reforms have not been passed 
because of lack of consensus both in the Mexican Congress and among  
the public (Brands, 2009: 42). 
 
3.2.2 Beyond Mérida – Obama and Calderon 
Once President Bush was leaving office, the results of the Mérida Initiative 
were quite bleak. Having known about negative connotations, his successor 
Barack Obama came up with a new approach called “Beyond Mérida”, in which 
he wanted to improve neglected sides of the strategy. He announced to focus 
more on institution building than military expansion. Alike, he voiced 
amplification of shared responsibility where the United States must take 
responsibility of drug demand in its territory, which prompts DTOs to transport 
illicit narcotics northward. The four pillars consist of: 
 
• “Disruption and dismantling criminal organizations 
• Institutionalizing the rule of law 
• Building a twenty-first century border 
• Building strong and resilient communities through social  
and economic reforms that range from job creation  
and neighborhood zoning to expanded daycare” (Abu-Hamdeh, 
2011: 45).  
  
3.3 Drug Enforcement Administration 
The Drug Enforcement Administration as it has been orchestrated  
by Nixon administration at the eve of 1970s is a law enforcement federal 
agency under         the Department of Justice. Apart from numerous divisions  
in the United States it expands to more than sixty countries sending its special 
agents, investigators, intelligence specialists and chemists to deal  
with narcotics. The main objectives of DEA are to dismantle structures of major 
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drug trafficking organizations, to disrupt their financial infrastructure, to combat 
a nexus between narco-trafficking and terrorism, to build a strategic partnership 
and to enhance intelligence and information sharing between drug-ridden 
countries, to balance between a dispersion of narcotics to the mainstream 
society and their conservation for medical, commercial and scientific purposes, 
and to support demand reduction initiatives.54      
 
3.3.1 Southwest Border Initiative  
The most resonant DEA strategy is conducted via the Southwest Border 
Initiative that works in close cooperation with the Department of Homeland 
Security, Attorney General and FBI, as well cross-border task forces in Tijuana, 
Juarez and Monterrey. It includes several programs and task forces such  
as OCDETF (Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces) that struggle  
to bolster law enforcement and to disrupt drug market resulting in reduction  
of drug supply. It utilizes wiretapping, monitoring, communication sharing  
and permanent incarceration of DTO leaders hoping this would leave them  
in disarray. In the past, there have been three principal operations that have 
taken place under the Southwest Border Initiative: 
 
 Operation Zorro II (1996) – a successful operation that brought criminals 
to justice for producing Colombian cocaine, transshipping through 
Mexico, and storing it Los Angeles where was expected to be distributed 
to American syndicates all around the U. S.55  
  
 Operation Reciprocity & Operation Limelight (1996 – 1997) – two 
separate but related operations that raided on warehouses in Tucson, 
Texas, seized tons of cocaine, kilos of marijuana and arrested dozens  
of international criminals.56 
 
                                                            
54 Drug Enforcement Administration. Southwest Border Initiative. See 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/sbi.htm, March 31st 2012.   
55 Drug Enforcement Administration. Operation Zorro II. See 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/major/zorro2.htm, March 31st 2012.   
56 Drug Enforcement Administration. Operation Reciprocity & Operation Limelight. See 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/major/reclime.htm, March 31st 2012.   
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Nowadays, it seems a fierce supply-side approach has borne its fruit, at least 
according to the latest DEA report that states that since 2000 teenage users  
of illicit drugs have experienced a 15 percent decline, marijuana dropped seven 
percent, cocaine, crack cocaine and LSD around 50 percent and drug users  
at workplace plummeted to the lowest in last 20 years.57     
 
3.3.2 Demand Reduction Program 
DEA has also promoted a demand program that echoed long ignored 
problem of drug use especially among children and teenagers. Demand 
Reduction Coordinates work with civil leaders, state and local drug prevention 
organizations, treatment experts and general public. They attempt to bring 
education to schools, families and local communities, as well as appeal  
on states and municipalities not to neglect such a dangerous phenomenon.  
They drive around schools and public institutions and run several websites 
on drug prevention informing children, parents and the public about kinds  
of drugs, where they can find it, what the effects of using are and how can 
damage human health and psyche.58     
3.4 Department of Homeland Security 
U. S. Department of Homeland Security was established  
in 2002 in response to 9/11 attacks, emerging War on Terror and protecting 
Americans within, at and outside their own borders. Unlike the Department  
of Defense deals with military issues, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) works with a civilian sphere and with more 240,000 employees  
from various professional sectors cast in the third largest Cabinet department. 
There are five main security objectives that DHS take responsibility for: 
 
• “Preventing terrorism and enhancing security 
• Securing and managing our borders 
• Enforcing and administering our immigration laws 
                                                            
57 Drug Enforcement Administration: 2012. Successes in the Fight Against Drugs. See 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/2011_successes_in_the_fight_against_drugs.pdf, March 31st 2012.  
58 Drug Enforcement Administration. DEA Drug Reduction Program. See 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/programs/demand.htm, March 31st 2012.   
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• Safeguarding and securing cyberspace 
• Ensuring resilience to disasters”59 
 
The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2004 was passed  
by the U. S. Congress and authorized the President to finance DHS operations. 
In 2012, DHS administers $56, 9 billion budget, and its central motto  
is “preserving our freedoms, protecting America…we secure our homeland”.60 
There are two main components relevant within the Border Security  
Program – Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration  
and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  
 
3.4.1 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
U. S. Customs and Border Protection is a federal law enforcement agency 
that was designed to “prevent the terrorists and their weapons from entering  
the United States”. It also tackles narcotics, agricultural pests and smuggled 
goods, protects American business from intellectual property theft, as well  
as apprehends those with a strong criminal record.   
CBP uses several tactics to fight above said matters. Border patrolling 
combines marine, air and land security checks at the entry points  
with inspections of convoys and cargo shipments inside the country (using 
biometric screening), with training for drug-sniffing dogs, with focusing  
on protection of human trafficking victims, and with building a viable 
infrastructure (roads, electrical components, fencing, lights etc.) along  
the border.61     
The latest strategy declared last July by the Homeland Secretary Janet 
Napolitano is called the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy.          
It operates within the framework of broader national drug control policy  
and increases coordination and information between Federal, state and local 
                                                            
59 Department of Homeland Security. Our Mission. See http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/our-
mission.shtm, April 2nd 2012.  
60 Department of Homeland Security. Our Mission. See http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/our-
mission.shtm, April 2nd 2012.   




law enforcement agencies as well as with the Mexican counterparts  
in interdicting contraband and arresting criminals.62  
 
3.4.2 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)  
U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is the second investigative 
law enforcement agency that together with CBP protect national security  
and public safety, administer border patrolling, customs examinations, control 
trade and immigration. Currently, they announce four primary missions to reach 
such standards.  
• Prevent terrorism and enhance security (through security visas, 
investigation tactics, deportations of those who pose national 
security threat, strong emphasis on cooperation with allies) 
• Protect the border against illicit trade, travel and finance (trough 
BEST task forces, targeting large scale smuggling organizations, 
increasing penalties, invigorating money laundering and intellectual 
property investigations) 
• Protect the borders through smart and tough interior immigration 
enforcement (through detaining and removing aliens seeking illegal 
entry, greater employer compliance, protecting integrity  
of the immigration system) 
• Construct an efficient agency (through reorganizing criminal 
investigations, civil immigration enforcement, management,  
and legal, through a stable work and wise using of resources).63 
 
3.5 White House Office of National Drug Control Policy 
The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)  
is a supportive office of the President and the Federal government which was 
founded by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 to address problems  
with drug-related activities. It emphasizes “community-based prevention 
                                                            
62 Department of Homeland Security. Senior Administration Officials Release Southwest Border 
Counternarcotics Strategy. See http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/20110707-napolitano-
southwest-counternarcotics.shtm, April 2nd 2012.  
63 U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. ICE Strategic Plan FY 2010-2014. See 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/library/reports/strategic-plan/strategic-plan-2010.pdf, April 2nd 2012.   
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programs, early intervention programs in healthcare settings, aligning criminal 
justice policies and health care systems to divert non-violent drug offenders  
into treatment instead of jail, funding scientific research on drug use 
and…expanding access to substance abuse treatment.”64 
Every year ONDCP issues a National Drug Control Strategy that 
coordinates efforts to defend American citizens from narcotics and their 
disastrous effects.  
 
3.5.1 National Drug Control Strategy 2011 
The latest National Drug Control Strategy 2011 released by the President 
Barack Obama has meant a significant shift in the conduct of drug issue that 
has been on table since the Nixon administration.   
In Congress, President Obama upheld two important bills that were signed 
into law. 
• Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (eliminates mandatory minimal 
sentence for simple possession of crack cocaine in Federal cases 
meanwhile increases penalties for drug traffickers) 
• Secure and Responsible Drug Disposal Act of 2010 (authorizes 
states and local offices to collect unused prescription drugs for safe 
disposal) 
 
The most impaired populations are students, especially at college, who 
submerge into binge drinking, which creates a by-product in form of missing 
classes, falling behind, worsening study results. Alike current conditions poses 
hurdles for women because treatment is often provided only for men  
and women must make       a choice between undergoing treatment and losing 
a child. This relates also to female youth who fall to depressions and peer 
pressure. There is also a concern about military veterans who have served 
overseas and after coming back suffer from traumatic shocks.     
The strategy views a string of priorities that should be implemented  
in the following years. Prescription drug abuse is the fastest-growing problem 
                                                            
64 White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. About. See 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/about, April 5th 2012.   
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afflicting all social classes including White Protestants, African Americans, 
Hispanics, Asians as well as other minorities. In 2007, more than 27,000 people 
have been overdosed by drugs legally acceptable in pharmacies, which indicate 
a five-fold growth since 1990. An electronic database called Prescription Drug 
Monitoring Programs, disposal methods to remove medications from the home, 
supportive education for patients and healthcare providers and reduction  
of illegal prescription practices make up the counter-tactics for other overdosed 
people.  
There is an urgent need to eliminate numbers of drugged drivers who 
constitute one-third in car crashes statistics. This ought to be accomplished 
through cooperation with NGOs and special enforcement and treatment 
programs.  
Probably, a major emphasis is oriented to prevent those who have never 
used drugs in the past. The Drug Free Communities Support Program aims  
to develop grassroots level to identify and respond to drug problems. This 
includes addressing school policies to limit alcohol retailers and drug dealers  
in the surroundings, setting up a healthy environment for students free from 
drugs, alcohol, bullying, harassment and violence. Likewise, it should help 
military personnel and their families to overcome mental disorder, and to enable 
women proper treatment. Eventually, it should promote education for the public 
via strong media campaign that reflects negative sides of prescription  
and non-prescription drug use.65           
 
3.6 Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
A predecessor of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms  
and Explosives (ATF) was formed in 1972 and in fact, various versions of such 
a law enforcement agency had existed even before. Finally, after 9/11 attacks it 
has gotten its present name and jurisdictionally belonged to the Department  
of Justice. Primary focus of the agency is centered at “violent criminals, criminal 
organizations, the illegal use and trafficking of firearms, the illegal use and 
                                                            
65 The White House: 2011. National Drug Control Strategy 2011. The White House: 
Washington, D. C.  
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storage of explosives, acts of arson and bombings, acts of terrorism,  
and the illegal diversion of alcohol and tobacco products”.66      
 
3.6.1 Strategic Plan – Fiscal Years 2010-2016 
ATF´s Strategic Plan for FY 2010 – FY 2016 constitutes a blueprint  
for the future how ATF will meet their successes in reducing organized crime. It 
earmarks four main objectives – 1) illegal firearms trafficking, 2) criminal groups 
and gangs,    3) explosives, bombs and bombings, 4) fire and arson.  
Firearms trafficking is one of the most dangerous threats, it plants wrath, 
fear, uncertainty and violence. ATF react against drug traffickers and diversion 
of illegal weapons due to gathering information at the National Tracing Center. 
They check out firearms licenses and registrations, regulate and partner with 
firearms industry, and eliminate importation of ammunition from Mexico via 
cooperation with CBP. They advocate controversial Project Gunrunner  
and move along the Gun Control Act of 1968, and international agreements.   
Cracking down on criminal groups and gangs should be achieved via 
expansion of VCIT (Violent Crime Impact Teams), special enforcement agents 
that have advanced training and use innovative technologies. It is necessary  
to share gang intelligence and coordinate efforts at the multi-agency level. 
Linkage between improvised explosive devices and violent crime is very 
close and often tends to decimate many lives. There are special agents trained 
for explosive expertise and investigations, forensic science laboratories, canine 
training program, and several cells conducting research and intelligence 
sharing. 
Growing examples of arson indicate that ATF must make communities 
safer from fire, enhance training programs for fire service and support  





                                                            
66 ATF. About ATF. See http://www.atf.gov/about/mission/, April 6th 2012.   
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Organized crime and drug-related violence poses a sinister threat both  
for Mexico and the United States. Mexican and U. S. officials differ  
in specification of warlike zone in Mexico – some call them drug cartels, some 
insurgents and terrorists, which often outrages opposite side. No matter how we 
semantically label amplification of drug trafficking in recent years it is underlying 
to admit that  security situation is worsening every single year.  
The United States of Mexico is still stumbling on inheritance of the rigid 
authoritarian rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) that has 
controlled nearly all sectors of public life for more than seven decades. 
Sequential period beginning at the end of 20th century has brought breath  
of fresh air into the politics and society. Nonetheless, initial aftershocks were  
of an economic nature. Mexico has been assailed by deep recession, high 
inflation and multiple devaluation of its own currency. This opened a gate  
for external bailouts in form of foreign direct investments, greater bilateral 
integration, finally leading to ratification of NAFTA that poured millions of dollars 
for job creation and setting up new businesses in Mexico, despite immediate 
loss of competitiveness. U. S. has conditioned economic recovery of Mexico  
on opening of the political system and granting fundamental freedoms, which 
paved the way for democratization.    
Sudden decentralization of the Mexican federal structure together  
with demolition of drug routes in the Caribbean have forced drug traffickers  
to find new ways of smuggling especially Andean cocaine and heroin heading  
to U. S. black market, and therefore Central American Isthmus seemed to be 
the safest alternative. Border areas in Mexico, as well as Guatemala, Honduras 
and El Salvador became the most dangerous parts of the world with high 
murder rates. Presidents Fox and Calderon started their offensive campaigns 
deploying thousands of police and military forces mostly in the northern part  
of the country. Meanwhile DTOs skillfully shifted to different territories that 
rendered a safe haven for their activities. Two frontlines appeared in the turf war 
– between DTOs and Federal government, and among DTOs themselves. 
President Calderon succeeded in capturing several chief leaders of drug 
cartels, as well as in interdiction of narcotics, firearms and money. Yet, we 
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might apply a proclamation of a U. S. Senator Von Raab from 1987 who 
commented on increasing drug seizure: “There is good news and bad news.         
The good news is that we are catching more drugs because we are getting 
better at doing our jobs. We have more resources. The bad news is that we are 
catching more because more is coming across” (Andreas, 2000: 46).  
Apart from violence Mexico is tackling profound institutional challenges 
that embody bygones from the past. Ubiquitous corruption and embezzlement 
reach all spheres including federal, state and municipal politics, police  
and military forces, judiciary, journalists and ordinary residents. High poverty 
and extreme poverty rates drive civilians to agree on tempting offers granting 
sudden enrichment, because they must often make a decision between life  
or death of themselves and their families. Wide range of reforms must be 
implemented in the armed forces – raising salaries and benefits, improving 
recruitment and selection criteria, offering specialized training and a system  
of merit based promotion, vetting officers, expanding in planning, tactical 
analysis, and requiring higher education. Judiciary must also go through radical 
reforms that would enforce civilian courts, oral trials, right of the accused  
and tougher measures on prosecuting organized crime.   
However, Mexico is not the only player that should feel responsibility  
for deterioration of security situation. The United States of America has been 
confronting severe difficulties in its nearly forty year-long drug war campaign. 
Scores of interdiction initiatives, secret and overt operations, lists of hostile 
countries collaborating with drug networks, several acts responding to drug use 
have been sketched like a blueprint to fight spread of violence from Latin 
American countries into its own territory.  
There have been series of by-products alongside spillover violence. 
Inflows of illegal immigrants have increased enormously in last two decades. 
Mexican communities settle down in the Southwest, they sometimes form 
closed diasporas reluctant to integrate into a majority society. Their primary 
reason for leaving their homeland is a Jeffersonian “pursuit of happiness”, so 
that they would find new jobs, new identity and new meaning of life. Recently, 
Mexicans though attempt to escape away from drug criminals, and finally 
become so-called narcorefugees and strangers in both countries. Firearms 
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trafficking ranks high among by-products of violence circle. In fact, smuggling  
of guns is a catalyst of violence. Although we do not precisely discern of what 
factory the guns might have come from, how long might have been abroad and 
what hands might have been intended to pass by, U. S. legislators should 
reassess their attitudes towards guns treatment. Otherwise, such an approach 
of cracking down on criminals while supplying them (directly or indirectly)  
with heavy weapons, ammunition and RPGs seems very hypocritical. Likewise, 
revenues from money laundering are getting higher, thereby criminals are more 
capable of buying new technological equipment, weapons, securing drug 
plazas, guaranteeing training for their members and finding bribes to corrupt 
local authorities. To cut off money resources and to sharpen inspection over 
foreign mafia must be a top priority for law enforcement.          
Presidents Clinton and Bush junior wagered on strong enforcement 
policies at the U. S. – Mexico border. Securitization, fencing and tightening 
border patrols have become a cornerstone of the Southwest Border Initiative 
and aimed at suspects who could pose threat for U. S. national security. Yet, it 
remains to be very questionable who might be labeled a narcotrafficker unless 
he is caught red-handed. Notwithstanding U. S. – Mexico border region is 
experiencing incredibly vibrant time being one of the most prosperous areas  
in the world. It generates millions of jobs, provides haven for American 
manufacture and service enterprises, offers millions of international tourists  
to visit the area and therefore to bring capital there. Moreover,   it is a unique 
biosphere with spate of natural resources and water supplies. Once     
U. S. officials claim to guard the border with complete fencing and strengthening 
controls of trade routes, they must realize that American firms would be shut 
down, and Mexican laborers would lose their jobs, which would spin the circle  
of uncertainty and easy way how to get hired by DTOs, again. It seems to be 
much more rational to do police and customs inspection outside the border,  
to facilitate customs transactions and to harmonize regulations in key sectors  
in the name of  “de-bordering the border”.  
The biggest failure of U. S. counter-drug strategy is apathy of drug use 
consumed by American citizens. Despite these repressive efforts, price  
of narcotics still remains very high, purity and availability of drugs is 
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augmenting. U. S. government and legislators must contemplate if incarceration 
of drug addicts is the well-proven instrument to reduce drug demand.  
Supply-side efforts have overshadowed a focus on demand side – prevention 
campaigns and treatment. There are several U. S. law enforcement agencies 
that fight drugs. They should primarily spread education about harmful effects  
of narcotics among children, teenagers, parents and employers. Battles for drug 
corridors would have never existed if there had not been consumption  
of psychotropic substances. As Peter Andreas remarks, “…laws and consumer 
demand are the most basic determinants of what smugglers smuggle” 
(Andreas, 2000: 17). It might be the right time to consider carefully  
if decriminalization of small drug possession should not be approved  
at the Federal level. This would almost automatically meet opposition  
of many who would call it infringement of the Constitution. Yet, I suppose such 
an extensive problem needs a comprehensive approach. Illustrative examples 
of Mexico and California that have taken this route might help the future.        
 Mérida Initiative may successfully back up favorable development.  
In order not to become second Plan Colombia, it must stress social projects 
concerning reducing poverty, corruption, offering jobs, education like  
an alternative for citizens so that they did not have to intermingle with drug 
criminals.  
Luis Astorga and David Shirk outline four prospective  
scenarios – 1) complicity with narcotraffickers creating a Pax Mafioso,  
2) strategy of direct confrontation against DTOs, 3) elimination of the black 
market for illicit drugs through prevention and treatment, 4) move away  
from absolute prohibition of drug production, distribution and consumption 
through decriminalization and re-legalization (Astorga, Shirk, 2010a: 51 - 56).  
If U. S. and Mexican officials give up two main determinants of drug trade 
– restoring confidence in institution-building of Mexico, and reducing 
consumption through demand – a relationship will be then seriously harmed.  
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AFI – Agencia Federal de Investigaciones (eng. Federal Investigations Agency)  
ATF – Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives 
BEST – Border Enforcement Security Task Force 
CBP – Customs and Border Protection 
DEA – Drug Enforcement Administration 
DHS – Department of Homeland Security 
DTO – Drug trafficking organization 
FBI – Federal Bureau of Investigation  
ICE – Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
INS – Immigration and Naturalization Service 
NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement  
OCDETF – Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces 
ONDCP – Office of National Drug Control Policy 
PAN – Partido Acción Nacional (eng. National Action Party) 
PF – Policía Federal (eng. Federal Police)    
PFP – Policía Federal Preventiva (eng. Federal Preventive Police) 
PFM – Policía Federal Ministerial (eng. Federal Ministerial Police) 
PGR – Procuraduría General de la República (eng. General Attorney´s Office) 
PJF – Policía Judicial Federal (eng. Federal Judicial Police) 
PRD – Partido de la Revolución Democrática (eng. Party of the Democratic 
Revolution) 
PRI – Partido Revolucionario Institucional (eng. Institutional Revolutionary 
Party) 
SEDENA – Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional (eng. Department of National 
Defense)  

































My Bachelor´s work deals with the matter that relates to a permanent 
relationship between the United States of America and the United States of 
Mexico. It analyzes the War on Drugs that takes place in Mexico, and what kind 
of effects it has for the U. S. national security.  
In the first chapter I reflect historical reminiscence of Mexican presence, 
role and mind-set of drug trafficking organizations as well as institutional 
challenges and shared responsibility of civil society.  
The second chapter is engaged in imminent threats – among them 
rooted asymmetries, U. S. drug consumption, firearms trafficking, money 
laundering, immigration and resolution of the mutual border – that endanger the 
well-being of the United States.     
The third chapter analyzes tools to combat organized crime and drug-
related problems including necessary Mexican reforms, bilateral projects, and 
U. S. specialized agencies.  
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Resumen  
Mi tesis trata del tema que se refiere a una relación permanente entre los 
Estados Unidos de América y los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Analiza la Guerra 
contra el narcotráfico en México y como esta  afecta a la seguridad nacional de 
los Estados Unidos. 
El primer capítulo refleja una reminiscencia histórica del México 
contemporáneo,  el papel y las maneras de las organizaciones narcotraficantes 
así como los retos de las instituciones y la resposabilidad compartida 
presentada por la sociedad cívica.  
El segundo capítulo entabla las amezanas inminentes – como asimetrías 
arraigadas, consumo de estupefacientes, tráfico de las armas, blanqueo de 
dinero, inmigración y propósito de la frontera común – que pone en peligro el 
bienestar de los Estados Unidos. 
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El tercer capítulo analiza las herramientas para combatir el crímen 
organizado y los problemas relacionados con las drogas incluso las necesarias 
reformas de México, los proyectos bilaterales y las especializadas agencias de 
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Graph from Chad C. Haddal, “Border Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol,” Congressional 
Research Service, August 11, 2010. 
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U.S. Border Patrol Budget, FY 1992-2009 
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